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I.

INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"),' or the
Taft-Hartley Act,2 was originally enacted, and is still commonly referred to,
as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")3 or the Wagner Act.4 The
t B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona; Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board.
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 1-5, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(2001). When the LMRA was enacted, additional "unrelated" provisions regulating other
aspects of the labor-management relationship were "appended [to Title I] as Titles II
through V of the Act". Dist. 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Amoco Oil Co., 554 F.2d
774, 776 (6th Cir. 1977). These latter LMRA provisions are not relevant to the issue addressed in this article. See Crilly v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1360 (3d Cir.
1976) (noting that "quite separate policies [are] implicated by Titles II-V" of the LMRA);
cf. Elkes v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, 540 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D.D.C. 1982) (observing that "[tihe
remaining Titles of the LMRA contain entirely new directives").
2. See Amoco Oil Co., 554 F.2d at 776 n.1; Potter Elec. Signal Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 373,
378 (1964). The reference is to the LMRA's congressional sponsors, Senator Robert Taft
and Representative Fred Hartley. See Robbins v. Prosser's Moving & Storage Co., 700 F.2d
433, 435 (8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Wiltse, 188 F.2d 917, 923 (6th Cir. 1951); TNS, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1447 n.199 (1992). For a critical academic assessment of the LMRA,
see Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1 (1992).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2001). See S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d at 1358 ("Title I
of the Taft-Hartley Act is still commonly referred to as the National Labor Relations
Act...."); Ferro v. Ass'n of Catholic Sch., 623 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The NLRA, as amended by the LMRA of 1947-the Taft-Hartley Act-comprises Title I
of the LMRA."); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp.
68, 71-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ("When one refers to the National Labor Relations Act,... he is
referring... to Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act .... "); Potter, 149 N.L.R.B.
at 378 ("Title I [of the LMRA] is also identified as the National Labor Relations Act. .. ")
4. See Amoco Oil Co., 554 F.2d at 776 (noting that the NLRA is "popularly referred to
as the Wagner Act"). This reference is to the NLRA's principal sponsor, Senator Robert
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NLRA (or the "Act") is the most comprehensive labor management legislation ever enacted in this country. It reflects Congress's attempt to promote collective bargaining 6 as an instrument for achieving "industrial democracy."7 In furtherance of this objective, the Act requires an employer to
bargain with the representative of a majority of its employees,8 which in
most cases means a union. 9
Wagner. See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 541 (1979). For a previous scholarly discussion of the Wagner Act, see generally Abner J. Mikva, The Changing
Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1123 (1986).
5. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969)
(describing the NLRA as "our most comprehensive national labor scheme"); cf.B. Glenn
George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the Maturing of the NLRA, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 509, 511 (1988) (describing the NLRA as "the first comprehensive legislation creating and protecting employee rights"). The NLRA is also one of Congress's most
controversial enactments. See Wiltse, 188 F.2d at 923 ("For the [first] fifteen years [after]
its passage by Congress, the National Labor Relations Act... aroused perhaps more controversy than any statute enacted during that period."); cf.U. S. v. Nat'l Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 391 (2d Cir. 1961) (observing that many of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA were highly controversial).
6. See NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963) (indicating that
"the basic philosophy of the Act... is the encouragement of collective - as opposed to individual - bargaining"). In this context, collective bargaining refers to "bargaining by an organization or group of workmen on behalf of its members with the employer." Thomas v.
LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The NLRA itself states:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2001).
7. Assoc'd Bldg. Contractors of Evansville, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 678, 686 (1963); see
also Riley Elec., Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 374, 378 (1988) (discussing the principles of industrial
democracy embodied within the Act); cf. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127,
131 (1982) (referring to the NLRA's democratic electoral process). For a critical assessment of the Act's effectiveness in this regard, see Charles B. Craver, The National Labor
Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397
(1992).
8. NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1976) (Campbell, J., dissenting).
See also Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In order to
achieve the collective bargaining recognized by the Act as national labor policy, ... the
statutory plan permits a majority of the employees in a [bargaining] unit to elect a union to
serve as their collective bargaining agent."); Fusco v. Richard W. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F.
Supp. 465, 474 (N.D. Ohio 1962) ("It is settled that the basic purpose of... the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, is to preserve to employees the freedom of choosing their
own representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.").
9. See Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Corp., 365 F.2d 651, 657 (8th Cir. 1966)
("Section 159(a) of the Act designates the representatives selected by a majority of the employees in a [bargaining] unit, which in most cases would be a Union, to be the exclusive
elected representatives of all the employees in that unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.") (internal punctuation omitted); In re Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 348,
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The designation of employee bargaining representatives is ordinarily
accomplished through representation elections,' which are provided for in
Section 9 of the NLRA." Because the Act contemplates that employees
will have "complete and unfettered freedom of choice" in selecting their
bargaining representatives,'2 the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"
or the "Board")' 3 requires that these elections be held under "laboratory
conditions."'" This somewhat controversial standard'5 is not a literal requirement, 6 but it does require that representation elections be conducted in
349 (1946) (describing unionization as a "necessary concomitant" to collective bargaining).
10. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1067 (3d Cir.
1980) ("The [Supreme] Court has noted the 'acknowledged superiority of the election process' as a method for selecting a majority representative of employees.") (quoting NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969)). However, a union's majority status may be
shown by means other than the holding of an election. See I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1968). For example, "union authorization cards, if obtained from a majority of employees without misrepresentation or coercion, are reliable
enough generally to provide a valid, alternative route to majority status.. " Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 579.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2001). See also Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471,475 (5th Cir.
1992) ("Section 9 addresses the role and selection of representatives.").
12. Hughes & Hatcher, Inc. v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting
NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (citation omitted)); Prospect Gardens of
Norwalk, 177 N.L.R.B. 136, 139 (1969) (quoting Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. at 588). See also
Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1979) (observing that "employee free
choice is a cornerstone of the National Labor Relations Act").
13. The Board is the federal agency charged with responsibility for administering the
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56, 159-61, 164(c) (2001); Rochester Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 896
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1990); ITT Lamp Div. of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d
989, 992 (1st Cir. 1970). In the election context, "Congress has entrusted a wide degree of
discretion to the Board to establish the procedures necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives." Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 131
(1982) (citation omitted).
14. See In re Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("In election proceedings,
it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees."); see also Med. Ancillary Servs., 212 N.L.R.B. 582, 584 (1974) (Penello, J. dissenting) (observing that "the Board, in General Shoe Corporation,adopted its 'laboratory
conditions' rationale").
15. See Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 240 (1975) (Penello, J. dissenting) ("The Board has
been criticized for insisting on its ideal 'laboratory conditions' standard.") (quoting Home
Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392, 399 n.16 (5th Cir. 1969)); Med. Servs., 212
N.L.R.B. at 585 (Penello, J. dissenting) ("I submit that under the guise of maintaining laboratory conditions we are treating employees not like mature individuals capable of facing
the realities of industrial life and making their own choices but as retarded children who
need to be protected at all costs."); N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 135, 139 (1954)
("We are inclined to regard the language... from the General Shoe decision.., as something less than felicitous.")
16. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559,
1562 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A]lthough the 'laboratory conditions' standard represents a noble
ideal, it must be applied flexibly, for in its extreme form it is a standard that 'no seasoned
observer considers realistic'.") (quoting Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics
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"an atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the
Act, but17also from other elements which prevent or impede a reasoned
choice.,

Certain conduct by an employer (and occasionally a union) 8 occurring
during the critical pre-election period' 9 can destroy these laboratory condi-

in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38,
45 (1964)); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 82, 90 (1978)
("[A]lthough the Board aspires to laboratory conditions in [an] election, it is recognized that
clinical asepsis is an unobtainable goal in the real world of union organizational efforts.")
(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted), enforcement denied, 594 F.2d 8 (4th Cir.
1979); N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. at 139 ("We should not think in terms purely academic of ideal laboratory experiments or 'requisite laboratory conditions' in appraising [an]
election ....
").With respect to this issue, the Board has stated:
In deciding whether the registration of a free choice is shown to have been unlikely, the Board must recognize that Board elections do not occur in a laboratory where controlled or artificial conditions may be established. We seek to
establish ideal conditions insofar as possible, but we appraise the actual facts in
the light of realistic standards of human conduct. It follows that elections must
be appraised realistically and practically, and should not be judged against theoretically ideal, but nevertheless artificial, standards.
Liberal Mkt., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482 (1954); see also Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. at 130 (noting with approval "the understanding and realism espoused in LiberalMarket").
17. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70, supplemented, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
See also Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1004, 1013 (1971) (quoting Sewell).
For a previous academic discussion of the Board's laboratory conditions requirement, see
James W. Wimberly, Jr. & Martin H. Steckel, NLRB Campaign Laboratory Conditions
Doctrine and Free Speech Revisited, 32 MERCER L. REV. 535 (1981).
18. See Home Town Foods, 416 F.2d at 397 n.9 (asserting that "the Board should apply
a single standard against which it will measure the campaign conduct of all parties who
might have interfered with employee free choice"); I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 366
(Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992) ("Generally, the same standards of preelection conduct
apply to both employers and unions."). As one Board administrative law judge has stated:
In the minds of prospective voters, misdeeds by competing parties do not erase
or neutralize each other, as an alkali neutralizes an acid. Indeed, such conduct
by a union, where found, compounds rather than nullifies employer misconduct,
and minimizes rather than improves the likelihood that an election will produce
a free and untrammeled employee choice.
Donelson Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1060 (1975).
19. In Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1278 (1961), the Board defined this
as the period between the filing of an election petition (see infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text) and the holding of the election itself. One court has noted that "[tihe Board focuses on this time period because it believes that the possibility of improper coercion or influence on employee choice is then at its highest, thus justifying special scrutiny of
employer actions." NLRB v. Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1997). For a
discussion of employer conduct during the pre-election period, see Bernard T. King, PreElection Conduct-ExpandingEmployer Rights and Some New and Renewed Perspectives,
2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 185 (1977).
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tions, 0 and thus nullify the results of a representation election. 2' This conduct includes, but is not limited to, acts that constitute unfair labor practices ' within the meaning of the NLRA.' Thus, the Board has stated:
"[Our] responsibility is to establish standards for the conduct of elections.
even
Where the standards drop too low, [we] will set aside an election
24
though the conduct does not constitute an unfair labor practice.
However, the Board has also held that an employer that has committed
an unfair labor practice can restore the laboratory conditions necessary for
a valid election by voluntarily remedying its conduct during the critical period before the election.' This article discusses an employer's right to restore laboratory conditions by repudiating its unfair labor practices, 2 with a
20. See, e.g., Tipton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890, 899 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that
an employer's actions during a union election campaign "clearly had the effect of... destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election"); Black Hills & Western
Tours, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 778, 794 (1996) (discussing employer conduct that "naturally
tended to destroy the laboratory conditions under which representation elections should be
conducted").
21. Unsatisfactory conditions for holding elections maybe created by promises of benefits, threats of economic reprisals, deliberate misrepresentations of material facts by an employer or a union, deceptive campaign tactics by a union, or by a general atmosphere of fear
and confusion caused by a participant or by members of the general public. Sewell Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
22. Employer unfair labor practices are defined in section 8(a) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (2001). See also Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Section
8(a) makes it an unfair labor practice.., for an employer to do any of five things."). In the
present context, they typically involve unlawful interference with the employees' rights under section 7 of the Act to organize and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2001).
23. See St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Employer
conduct that does not rise to the level of an unfair labor practice may upset... 'laboratory
conditions."') (citations omitted); NLRB v. Tenn. Packers, Inc. Frosty Morn Div., 379 F.2d
172, 181 (6th Cir. 1967) ("It is not necessary that conduct which interferes with the freedom
of choice in an election actually constitute an unfair labor practice."); NLRB v. Clearfield
Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1963) ("[I]n the appraisal by the Board of the bases for
refusing to certify an election deemed contaminated, it is not required to rely on conduct
which would qualify as an unfair labor practice....").
24. NVF Co., Hartwell Div., 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 664 (1974). See also Nabors Alaska
Drilling Co., 325 N.L.R.B. 574, 585 (1998) ("Critical period conduct which creates an atmosphere rendering improbable a free choice warrants invalidating an election. Such conduct need not rise to the level of an unfair labor practice.") (footnote and citation omitted),
enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 190 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999); Jeffrey Mfg. Div., 248 N.L.R.B. 33, 62 (1980) (observing that "the degree of proof necessary
to sustain election objections is less than that to establish unfair labor practices").
25. See Action Mining, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 652, 654 (1995). But cf.NLRB v. Hale
Mfg. Co., 602 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing a situation in which "the only way
to assure 'laboratory conditions' [were] restored [was] to hold a new election").
26. There appears to have been no significant prior academic consideration of this issue. See generally Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495, 497 (1993) ("Despite the election's centrality to contemporary labor law, it has hardly been a focal point of legal scholarship.").
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specific focus on whether it must fully remedy its unlawful conduct under
the rigid standards set forth in the Board's Passavant line of cases.u
The article begins with a summary of the NLRA's representation
election process.29 It then considers the impact of employer unfair labor
practices on the validity of an NLRA election." After discussing the employer's right to remedy its unfair labor practices under Passavant,3' the article explores that case's impact on the employer's ability to restore the
laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election. 2 The article ultimately
concludes that while the Passavantrepudiation requirements are relevant in
determining whether an employer's unfair labor practices invalidated an
election,33 compliance with Passavantis not essential to a finding that laboratory conditions have been restored. 34
II.

THE NLRA ELECTION PROCESS

The determination of whether a particular union represents a majority
of the employees in a bargaining unit35 typically begins when the union or
one of the employees files a certification petition with the Board 6 When
27. Passavant Mem'l Area Hosp., 237 N.L.R.B. 138 (1978). While Passavantis now
considered the seminal Board repudiation case (see infra notes 83-97 and accompanying
text) the Board there simply "rearticulated... the standards which a party must follow to
effectively purge itself of unlawful conduct." Groceries and Food Prods., 324 N.L.R.B.
1193, 1199 (1997). See also infra note 191.
28. See Times Herald Printing Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 700, 710 (1994) (discussing "the selfremedying cases such as Passavant... and its progeny"); Astro Printing Servs., Inc., 300
N.L.R.B. 1028, 1038 n.40 (1990) (referring to "the line of cases headed by Passavant");International Automated Machs. Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1133 (1987) (discussing "Passavant... and its progeny"); Wayne J. Griffin Elec., Inc., No. 1-CA-34180, 1999 NLRB
LEXIS 40, at * 11 (Feb. 4, 1999) (referring to "the Board's Passavantline of cases").
29. See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 98-345 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 346-59 and accompanying text.
35. The term "bargaining unit" has been defined as "a grouping of two or more employees aggregated for the assertion of organizational rights or for collective bargaining."
Salary Policy Employee Panel v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 149 F.3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 1998)
(quoting 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 448-49). See also Vilda Samuel
Laurin III, Note, The Vote and Impound Procedure: Not Always a Guardian of Employee
Free Choice, 62 IND. L.J. 1127, 1128 n.10 (1987) ("A bargaining unit is a group of employees who may properly be grouped for the purposes of voting in an NLRB election and for
collective bargaining.") One court has stated: "The touchstone of an appropriate bargaining
unit is the finding that all of its members have a common interest in the terms and conditions of employment, to warrant their inclusion in a single unit to choose a bargaining
agent." Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Ideal Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964)).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (2001); see also Action Mining Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 652, 660
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the petition is filed by a union claiming to be the employees' exclusive bargaining representative 7 it must be accompanied by appropriate "evidence
of representation., 38 This usually takes the form of authorization cards39
signed by at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit and
designating the union as their representative. 4°
Once a certification petition has been filed,41 it is investigated by a
Board agent to determine whether there exists "a bona fide question con-

(1995) (noting that the "usual course of events" is for the union to "file a petition with the
Board"). Alternatively, the petition could be filed by the employer after a union has presented it with a claim to be the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. 29 C.F.R. §
101.17.
37. It is not unusual for more than one union to claim to be the exclusive representative
of the employees in a bargaining unit. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2001) (discussing
the situation in which "two or more labor organizations are included as choices in an election"); Burke Oldsmobile, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 79, 85 (1960) (describing an employer "faced
with conflicting claims of rival unions to represent its employees for purposes of collective
bargaining"). In that event, the employer must "maintain a position of strict neutrality," and
"refrain from any action which tends to give either an advantage over its rival." NLRB v.
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1954).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17. See also MGM Grand Hotel Inc., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1202,
1208 n.5 (1999) (Brame, J., dissenting) (observing that "the Board will not conduct a secret
ballot election unless a union's petition is accompanied by evidence of representation").
The Board has stated that "[tlhe purpose of requiring [this] preliminary showing of interest
in a representation proceeding is to enable the Board to determine whether the conduct of an
election serves a useful purpose under the [Act]." Potomac Elec. Power Co., 111 N.L.R.B.
553, 556 (1955) (citation omitted).
39. See Motion Picture & Videotape Editors Guild, 311 N.L.R.B. 801, 806 (1993)
("The evidence submitted by labor organizations in support of the.., showing of interest is
usually in the form of signed and dated authorization cards .. "); Passaic Daily News, 222
N.L.R.B. 1162, 1166 n.13 (1976) (noting that a union's showing of interest is "usually submitted in the form of signed authorization cards"); JEFFREY A. NoRRis & MICHAEL J.
SHERSHIN, JR., How To TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 100 (6th ed. 1992) ("Authorization
cards on which employees apply for membership in the labor organization and/or authorize
the union to represent them are most frequently submitted as evidence of interest.").
40. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17, 101.18(a) (2001). See also NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc.,
613 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1979) ("As a rule of thumb, the NLRB normally investigates
only those petitions which indicate that the union is supported by at least 30 percent of the
company's employees."). But see S.H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1248 (1962) ("The
Board's authority to conduct [an] investigation of... the petition is not dependent upon a
petitioner's showing of interest of any specific percentage ... ").
41. The Board's rules also provide for the filing of "decertification petitions," which are
intended to test the question of whether a presently certified or recognized agent is still the
exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (2001).
Although the procedures involved in commencing the decertification process differ from
those involved in the certification process, see id., the issues addressed in this article concerning the restoration of the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid representation
election are equally applicable in both situations. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(2) (2001) ("In determining whether or not a question of representation... exists, the same regulations and rules
of decision apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of
relief sought.").
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cerning representation within the meaning of the Act. ' 2 If this investigation reveals that there is reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, 43 and that an election would reflect the free choice of the

employees in the bargaining unit," the Board agent will initially encourage
the parties to consent to an election4 5 in order to avoid the expense and inconvenience of a Board hearing.46
If the parties47 do not consent to an election to determine whether a
particular union represents a majority of the employees in a bargaining

42. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a). See also NLRB v. Lovejoy Indus., 904 F.2d 397, 400 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("Members of the Board must delegate investigation and fact-finding tasks to
subordinates, and with delegated power [sic] come standards of action."); S.H. Kress, 137
N.L.R.B. at 1248 (discussing "the necessary investigation of the question concerning representation raised by the petition").
43. A "'question of representation' describes the circumstances which must exist before
the Board is empowered to direct an election in [the] appropriate [bargaining] unit." United
States Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 502, 503 (1981); see also Maxwell Co. v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 477, 489 (6th Cir. 1969) (McAllister, J., dissenting) ("If such a question does not exist,
the only procedure that seems reasonable to follow is to dismiss the Union's petition ....
").
44. 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a) (2001); Cincinnati Newspaper Guild v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc., 650 F. Supp. 26, 29 (S.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1988).
45. The NLRA provides for "the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a
consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board." 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(4) (2001); see also NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Co., 411 F.2d 189, 191 (1st Cir.
1969) (noting that consent elections "are expressly authorized by § 9(c)(4) of the ...Act").
46. See Chelsea Clock Co., 411 F.2d at 191-92 (observing that consent elections "afford
considerable savings of time and expense," and thus are "to be encouraged"); NORRIS &
SHERSHIN, supra note 39, at 118 ("If... it appears that the petition is valid, the Board agent
will encourage the parties to consent to an election in order to avoid the time and expense of
a formal hearing."). As noted in one Board decision:
[T]he parties [may] voluntarily forego the hearing by entering into an agreement
controlling all aspects of the election.... This voluntary device has the... advantage of freeing the Board from an overwhelming burden of cases by avoiding, to a large extent, the need for Board review. Thus, we must encourage voluntary stipulations to accelerate the processes of justice and effectuate the
purposes of the Act.
Sunnyvale Med. Clinic, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1158 (1979) (Penello, J. & Truesdale, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
47. The Board has defined the term "party" to include:
[A]ny person named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as a
right to be admitted as a party, in any Board proceeding, including, without
limitation, any person filing a charge or petition under the act, [and] any person
named as respondent, as employer, or as party to a contract in any proceeding
under the act.
29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1999). However, not every such party may have the ability to withhold
consent to the election. See id. ("[N]othing herein shall be construed to prevent the
Board... from limiting any party to participate in the proceedings to the extent of his interest only.").
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unit, the Board is required to hold a hearing" and, if it finds that a question
of representation does exist,49 direct that an election be held.5 0 Regardless
of whether the election proceeds with the parties' consent or at the Board's
direction,5' it is conducted by secret ballot, 2 and under the direct supervision of Board agents. 3
Once the election has been held,' a union claiming that the emconduct interfered with laboratory conditions can
ployer's pre-election
file with the Board one or more "objections to conduct affecting the results

48. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2001); Angelica Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 315
N.L.R.B. 1320, 1320-21 (1995). See also Chelsea Clock Co., 411 F.2d at 192 ("Whereas in
consent elections the parties stipulate [to] such issues as the proper unit, voter eligibility,
etc., in a Board-conducted election the Board is required to hold a hearing on these questions."); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 415 ("In the absence of... [a]
consent election agreement, the [Board's] regional director will proceed to a hearing.").
49. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 348, 361 (1946) ("Congress provided...
for a hearing for the purpose of adducing evidence on questions of representation."); NORRIS
& SHERSHiN, supra note 39, at 144 ("The purpose of the representation hearing is to gather
factual information necessary for.., the Board to rule upon a question concerning representation.").
50. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1); NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 750 (9th
Cir. 1979); Angelica HealthcareServs. Group, 315 N.L.R.B. at 1320-21; see also New Berlin Trading Co. v. NLRB, 946 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Ihe Board has no authority
to direct an election where no question of representation exists.").
51. Grant's Home Furnishings, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1305 (1977) ("[The Board's
rules, regulations, and pertinent decisional law are the same for stipulated elections as for
Board-directed elections."); Jasper Pool Car Serv., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1032 (1969)
("[lit is clear that the Board intended consent elections to be governed by the same rules as
elections conducted after a hearing.").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2001). The Board has stated: "The
secret ballot is expressly required by the Act. The Board is under a duty to preserve it and it
is a matter of public concern, rather than a personal privilege subject to waiver by the individual voter." J.Brenner & Sons, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 656, 659 n.4 (1965); see also Magic
Pan, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 105, 109 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The Board's requirement of complete secrecy of the ballot cannot be waived.").
53. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a). See also NLRB v. S. Health Corp., 514 F.2d 1121, 1123
(7th Cir. 1975) ("[Ihe Board is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting elections
and of supervising the conduct and actions of the parties therein concerned to insure a free,
unfettered exercise of self-determination."); NORms & SHERSHIN, supra note 39, at 218
("The actual voting is always conducted and supervised by NLRB agents.").
54. Generally speaking, the timing of a representation election "is a matter for the
Board to decide." Intalco Aluminum Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 975, 976 (1969) (Fanning, J., dissenting). It is also the Board's practice to conduct such elections "as expeditiously as possible." City Mkts., 273 N.L.R.B. 469, 470 (1984). Nevertheless, "Board elections are invariably conducted with some advance notice, 72 hours at the very least." Taft Broad., 201
N.L.R.B. 801, 811 (1973).
55. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (discussing an election in which
"the Employer's propaganda... exceeded permissi[ble] limits and so inflamed and tainted
the atmosphere in which the election was held that a reasoned basis for choosing or rejecting
a bargaining representative was an impossibility"), supplemented, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
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of the election. 56 If, after an investigation,57 the Board concludes that the
union's objections lack merit, 58 the election results will stand 9 and, depending on the vote tally,' the union either will or will not be certified as
the employees' exclusive bargaining representative.'
56. Thomas Prods. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 706, 706 n.1 (1968) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
102.69(a)). See also Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that "a
party to the election... [is] entitled to lodge an objection with the Board claiming that the
election did not represent the free choice of the employees"); Grant's Home Furnishings,
229 N.L.R.B. at 1305-06 (observing that "complaints concerning an election must... be
raised by properly filed objections at the postelection stage of the proceeding"); see, e.g.,
Ridgely Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 860, 860 (1972) (discussing a union that "had filed... objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, alleg[ing], inter alia, that [certain]
employees.., were terminated and other persons were hired just before the election, destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair Board election").
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(1)(2001). This investigation may or may not include a
formal hearing on the union's objections. See NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415
F.2d 26, 33 (5th Cir. 1969) ("It is well established that a hearing is not required in every
case to determine the validity of objections to a Board-conducted election .... ") (citing
NLRB v. Smith Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1968)); NLRB v. Chelsea Clock
Co., 411 F.2d 189, 192 (1st Cir. 1969) ("For while the [Board's] Regional Director may
hold a hearing on objections to an election, in most cases he need not, and indeed does
not."); Cadillac Steel Prods. Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1048 (1964) ('There is no statutory
authority for any claim that a party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a postelection hearing.").
58. In this situation, the union would have the burden to prove that there had been
prejudice to the fairness of the election. See NLRB v. Banta Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821, 826
(4th Cir. 1967). Moreover, consider the following:
This is a heavy burden; it is not met by proof of mere misrepresentations or
physical threats. Rather, specific evidence is required, showing not only that the
unlawful acts occurred, but also that they interfered with the employees' exercise of free choice to such an extent that they materially affected the results of
the election.
Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d at 30.
59. In Ralph Printing & Lithography Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1353, 1354 n.3 (1966), the
Board held:
An election under Board auspices to determine a majority bargaining representative does not consist solely of the physical balloting of the employees in the
appropriate unit. Necessarily, the vote of the employees and the validity of the
election itself must await the Board's post election investigation of objections
properly filed with respect to the conduct of the election.
60. Section 9(a) of the NLRA states that collective bargaining representatives are to be
selected by "the majority of the employees in a unit." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(2001). The Board
interprets this language to mean a majority of those employees voting in the election. See
Lemco Constr., 283 N.L.R.B. 459, 459 (1987). In the event of a tie, the union has failed to
obtain a majority of the votes cast in the election, and thus will not be certified as the employees' bargaining representative. CadillacSteel Prods., 149 N.L.R.B. at 1049.
61. See United Refrigerated Servs., 325 N.L.R.B. 258, 260 (1998). Certification of the
election results precludes the holding of any additional elections during the ensuing twelve
month period addressing representation of the employees in the bargaining unit at issue. 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), (e)(2) (2001); see also St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 137
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("In the first year following its certification by the Board as a collective
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If, on the other hand, the Board concludes that the employer's conduct
interfered with the employees' right to express their free choice (in other
words, that laboratory conditions did not exist),62 it will set the election
aside' and, at least ordinarily,64 direct that a new election be held.
III. THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS

Employer actions that interfere with employee rights under the NLRA
are known as "unfair labor practices," ' and may give rise to independent
statutory remedies67 through Board unfair labor practice proceedings.'
bargaining representative of employees, a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support.").
62. See NLRB v. Hale Mfg. Co., 602 F.2d 244, 249 n.1l (2d Cir. 1979) ("For a union
certification to be valid, laboratory conditions necessary for the conduct of a free and fair
election must be maintained") (citing Gen. Elec. Wiring Devices, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 876,
878 (1970)).
63. See United RefrigeratedServs., 325 N.L.R.B. at 260 ("If the Board determines that
the conduct of a party has interfered with the right of employees to register their free choice
in the election, then the results are deemed not to reflect the uninhibited desires of the employees, [and] the election is set aside....").
64. If the employer's unfair labor practices were sufficiently serious that even a second
election could not be conducted under laboratory conditions, the Board might order the employer to bargain directly with the union. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 61314 (1969). However, the Board's authority to issue a bargaining order when the union's
representative status has not been established through a valid representation election is the
subject of spirited debate. See Nabors Alaska Drilling Co., 325 N.L.R.B 574, 574-77 (1998)
(Gould, W., Chairman, dissenting in part), enforced in partand enforcement denied in part,
190 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999). For an academic discussion of this potential remedy, see
David S. Shillman, Note, Nonmajority Bargaining Orders: The Only Effective Remedy for
Pervasive Employer Unfair Labor PracticesDuring Union Organizing Campaigns, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 617 (1987).
65. See Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1206, 1215 n.5 (1992) (noting that
the Board's usual policy is to direct that a new election be held when unfair labor practices
served to interfere with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election); 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 374 ("Typically, when the Board sustains a
party's objections to an election it will... direct a rerun [election].").
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(8), 158(a) (2001).
67. Section 10(c) of the Act authorizes the Board to take affirmative remedial action in
response to an employer's unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2001). See also
NLRB v. Aluminum Casting & Eng'g Co., 230 F.3d 286, 295 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing
section 10(c)). Although the selection of remedies to enforce the labor laws is a matter
within the special competence of the Board, see Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144,
145-46 (3d Cir. 1979), the Board's chosen remedy should as nearly as possible restore the
parties to the status quo that existed before the unfair labor practices occurred, and thereby
eliminate the imbalance created by the employer's violations of the Act. See Decaturville
Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984) (stating that the remedy must be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2001); 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2-.16, 102.9-.59 (2001). For a detailed
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However, that is not the only potential impact of an employer's unfair labor
practice.6 9 In Dal-Tex Optical Co.,70 the Board held that an employer's
violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Ace1 during the critical pre-election period was also "a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a
free and untrammeled choice in an election. 72
Because section 8(a)(1) is the "blanket" NLRA provision shielding
employees from an employer's unlawful conduct,73 most employer actions
that constitute unfair labor practices because they violate more particular-75
ized provisions of the Ace 4 also violate section 8(a)(1) "derivatively.
Thus, an employer's commission of virtually any unfair labor practice
during the pre-election period is synonymous with the Section 8(a)(1) violation 76 that was generally deemed to constitute per se interference with the
academic discussion of the Board's unfair labor practice proceedings, see Dennis R. Nolan
& Richard I. Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor PracticeProcedures,57 TEx. L. REv. 47
(1979).
69. See VJNH, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 87, 103 (1999) ("In addition to the normal Board
remedies for unfair labor practices.... the election [may] be set aside and a new election.., held."); Teamsters Local 703 (Kennicott Bros.), 284 N.L.R.B. 1125, 1128 (1987)
(Dotson, D., Chairman, dissenting) ("[W]e have used the broad discretion granted us under
Section 10 of the Act to fashion special remedies as necessary to correct the effects of unfair
labor practices, including those occurring in the context of election proceedings.").
70. 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
72. Dal-Tex Optical, 137 N.L.R.B. at 1786. See also Mississippi Valley Structural
Steel Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1132 n.2 (1972) (indicating that Dal-Tex Optical "could be
read as meaning that any [section] 8(a)(1) conduct, regardless of its lack of impact on the
results, requires setting the election aside", but rejecting that conclusion in this case).
73. Microimage Display Div. of Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 245, 250 (D.C. Cir.
1991). See also Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing section
8(a)(1) as the NLRA's broadest proscription of employer conduct).
74. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2)-(5) (2001). See also NLRB v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
688 F.2d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Section[s] 8(a)(2)-(5) was [sic] intended by Congress to
be a nonexhaustive list of four specific types of employer behavior [also] barred by section
8(a)(1)."); Fun Striders, Inc. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1981) (observing that
"[S]ections 8(a)(2)-(5) ...establish more specific categories of employer unfair labor practices"); cf.NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 1941) (indicating that "sections 8(a)(2)-(5) all relate to particular species of the generic unfair practice.., defined [in section 8(a)(1)] and are specifically mentioned merely because of their
prevalence").
75. Microimage Display Div., 924 F.2d at 250; Fun Striders, 686 F.2d at 661; see also
South Cent. Bell Tel., 688 F.2d at 354 (observing that "a violation of any of section[s]
8(a)(2)-(5) also constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(1)"); Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976,
978 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The Board has consistently observed that violations of any of the
other subdivisions of § 8(a) are also violations of § 8(a)(1).") (citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468, 1476 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding
that "a breach of section 8(a)(3) automatically violates section 8(a)(1)"); NLRB v. Swedish
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 619 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1980) (declaring that "[a]ny violation of Section
8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5) necessarily includes a derivative violation of Section 8(a)(1)"); Ind. &
Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 229 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[a] violation
of § 8(a)(3) constitutes a derivative violation of § 8(a)(1) when.., the employer's acts
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employees' freedom of choice under Dal-Tex Optical.77 As a result, the
Board's normal practice was to set aside any election in which the employer committed an unfair labor practice during the critical pre-election
period."
However, the Board no longer adheres to the categorical view expressed in Dal-Tex Optical.7 9 It instead now holds that an employer's
commission of an unfair labor practice during the critical pre-election period -will not invalidate an election if the impact of the employer's conduct
on the outcome of the election was "de minimis."'
This revised and
slightly more forgiving standard'1 suggests that the laboratory conditions
necessary for a valid election can sometimes be restored if an unfair labor
practice occurring during the pre-election period is promptly remedied. 2
served to discourage union membership or activities"). But cf NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp.,
373 F.2d 595, 602 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1967) (asserting that "[a]n 8(a)(5) violation does not necessarily encompass an 8(a)(1) violation").
77. See NLRB v. Harbor Crest Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. 581, 588 (1992) (noting that "Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices are treated as objectionable conduct which, a
fortiori, interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an NLRB election
sufficient to warrant setting aside an election outcome") (emphasis added); Jennie-O Foods,
Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. 305, 340 (1991) (stating that "unfair laborpractices.., a fortiori interfere with the conduct of an election" under Dal-Tex Optical) (emphasis added).
78. See Caron Int'l, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1121 (1979) (Jenkins, H. & Truesdale, J.,
dissenting in part) (quoting Dal-Tex, 137 N.L.R.B. at 1786); Super Thrift Mkts., 233
N.L.R.B. 409, 409 (1977); see also NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra note 39, at 240 (discussing
the Board's doctrine that conduct constituting an unfair labor practice is sufficient grounds
for setting aside an election).
79. See Bell Halter, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1223 (1985) (noting that "[iun more recent
years, the Board has refused to adopt a per se approach in applying the principles of Dal-Tex
Optical"); Mcndustries, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1304 n.3 (1976) (stating that "the
Dal-Tex Optical test should not be applied mechanically"); Miss. Valley Structural Steel
Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1132 n.2 (1972) (noting that, "the Board, although citing Dal-Tex
with approval, [has] limited its language in subsequent cases".); I THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supranote 18, at 86 ("[T]he Board [has] qualified its Dal-Tex approach; it is no longer
a per se requirement that an election be automatically set aside whenever section 8(a)(1)
conduct has occurred during the preelection period.")
80. See Detroit Edison Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 564, 566 n.7 (1993); Metz Metallurgical
Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 889, 889 (1984); see, e.g., Caron Int'l, 246 N.L.R.B. at 1120 (finding
an employer's unfair LABOR practices to be too minimal to have interfered with the results of
the election); Miss. Valley StructuralSteel Co., 196 N.L.R.B. at 1132 (finding that the employer's unfair labor practices were insubstantial and so limited in their impact as to have
had no material effect on the results of the election).
81. One Board administrative law judge has interpreted the relaxed Dal-Tex Optical
standard to mean that a section 8(a)(1) violation is now "normally held to be conduct which
interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election." Mclndustries,
Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. at 1304 (emphasis added). But see NLRB v. Lovejoy Indus., 904 F.2d
397, 401 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that "[p]revailing doctrine has it that employees are
hardy, so that the results of elections usually stand despite imperfections that would have led
to re-runs ... in earlier years").
82. In NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 1986), for example, the
court concluded that unfair labor practices that were promptly repudiated by the employer
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THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO CURE ITS UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Passavant Memorial Area Hospital3 is the seminal Board decision
addressing an employer's right to remedy its unfair labor practices by voluntarily repudiating them without Board intervention.' 4 The case involved
an employer's attempt to repudiate its previous unlawful threat to discharge
economic strikers. 5 While concluding that the attempted repudiation did
not eliminate the need for a Board remedy,86 the Board indicated that, under
certain circumstances, employers can avoid statutory liability by voluntarily remedying their unfair labor practices."
In order to claim the benefit of Passavant's"repudiation doctrine,"8
the employer's disavowal of its unfair labor practice must not only be
timely, 9 but "unambiguous, specific in nature to the [unlawful] conduct,
had resulted in de minimis interference with its employees' organizational rights; see also
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 574, 585 (1998) (observing that the de minimis
doctrine applies to unlawful conduct that is largely rendered meaningless by subsequent
conduct), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 190 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999);
cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1973) (discussing an
employer's contention that its unfair labor practice was an isolated, remedied, and, therefore, de minimis occurrence); Benteler Indus., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 712, 712 n.1 (1997) (concluding that an employer did not remedy a prior violation of Section 8(a)(1) or render it de
minimis).
83. 237 N.L.R.B. 138 (1978).
84. See Action Mining, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 652, 654 (1995) (declaring that "[tihe
Board's standard for an appropriate repudiation of unfair labor practices is set forth in Passavant"); Agri-Int'l Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 925, 937 (1984) ("In Passavantthe Board set forth
the standards to be utilized in considering whether an employer has effectively repudiated
its unlawful conduct so as to avoid the finding of a violation of the Act based on such conduct.").
85. Passavant,237 N.L.R.B. at 138. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
threaten to discharge an employee for engaging in an economic strike. Emerson Elec. Co.,
287 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1066 (1988); Aero Quality Plating Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 138, 138 (1986).
86. Passavant,237 N.L.R.B. at 139. Among other things, the Board concluded that the
disavowal was neither sufficiently clear nor sufficiently specific to obviate the need for further remedial action. Id.
87. Id. at 138; see also NLRB v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 729 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir.
1984) (citing Passavant for the proposition that "under some circumstances an employer
may repudiate its unlawful conduct and thereby relieve itself from liability").
88. St. Vincent's Hosp., 729 F.2d at 732; see also Mantrose-Haeuser Co., 306 N.L.R.B.
377, 380 (1992) (discussing "the defense of 'repudiation' [under] Passavant"). But see Kawasaki Motors Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 502, 519 (1981) (expressing "doubts that the Board's
pronouncements on the subject may be said to have ever risen to the level of a 'doctrine"').
89. See Foster Elec., 308 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1260 (1992); Int'l Automated Machs., 285
N.L.R.B. 1122, 1133 (1987). Compliance with Passavant'stimeliness requirement is often
critical. See, e.g., MPG Transp., Ltd., 315 N.L.R.B. 489, 489 n.1 (1994) (finding that an
employer's attempted repudiation was untimely where it occurred "approximately 1 month"
after the unfair labor practice was committed), enforced, 91 F.3d 144 (6th Cir. 1996); Phillips Indus. Components, 216 N.L.R.B. 885, 885 n.2 (1975) (finding that a delay of "about 2
weeks" was "too great").
90. FosterElec., 308 N.L.R.B. at 1260 (discussing Passavant).
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free from other proscribed conduct, adequately published to the employees
involved, accompanied by assurances that the employer will not interfere
with the employees' Section 7 rights in the future and not followed by
[any] additional illegal conduct." 9° If these requirements are met,9 the
Board presumes that the employer's unlawful conduct has been adequately
remedied, 2 and there is no need for further Board intervention.93
The Passavantstandards are stringent,' and difficult for employers to
meet.95 If they must be satisfied in order to restore the laboratory conditions necessary to conduct a valid representation election,9 6 employers who
have committed unfair labor practices during the critical pre-election period

will rarely be able to avoid a Board finding that the election was invalid.97
91. The Board has indicated that "[tihe criteria of Passavantare stated in the conjunctive; all must be satisfied before an employer may escape liability for its unfair labor practices." Raysel-IDE, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1987).
92. See Action Mining, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 652, 654 (1995) ("Under Board law and
policy ....the [employer's] predisavowal unfair labor practices are considered.., adequately remedied...").
93. See Gen. Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (indicating that by satisfying Passavant,an employer may have "cured its unfair
labor practices so entirely that no further Board proceedings are appropriate") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
94. See Webco Indus., 327 N.L.R.B. 172, 175 (1998) (Hurtgen, J., dissenting in part),
enforced, 217 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2000); FosterElec., 308 N.L.R.B. at 1259; Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1086 (1990), enforced sub nom. Gen. Indus. Employees
Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf. Dallas Times Herald, 315
N.L.R.B. 700, 710 (1998) (describing the Passavant standard as stringent); Grocery and
Food Prods., Processors, Canneries, Frozen Food Plants, Sugar Processors, Confectionary
and Candy Mfrs. and Distribs., 324 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1199 (1997) (describing the Passavant
standards as "strict").
95. See, e.g., Grief Bros. Corp., No. 34-CA-8726, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 128, at *78-79
(Feb. 29, 2000) (declining to find that the employer had "effectively repudiated [its] unlawful conduct" under Passavant,even though it had "satisfied virtually all of the requirements
for an effective repudiation"). In some cases, little analysis has been needed to establish
that an employer's attempt to rectify its misconduct failed to satisfy Passavant. See, e.g.,
Value City Dep't Stores, No. 8-CA-21914, 1991 NLRB LEXIS 1147, at *243 (Sept. 13,
1991); Mohawk Liqueur,300 N.L.R.B. at 1086.
96. This issue was not addressed in Passavantitself. Even before Passavantwas decided, however, one Board member asserted that "[o]nly a complete and timely disavowal
by the Employer... [can] restore[] to [employees] the strict laboratory conditions.., so
vigorously insisted upon by this Board in representation elections." Stewart-Warner Corp.,
102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1160 (1953) (Murdock, A., dissenting).
97. See generallyTrencor, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-60130, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12694,
at *32 n.16 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997) (Garza, J., dissenting) ("he Board almost invariably
overturns an election where it finds unfair labor practices were committed during the
pre-election period.") (citing Dal-Tex Optical, 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962)); Caron Int'l, Inc.,
246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1121 (1979) (Jenkins, H. & Truesdale, J., dissenting in part) ("It is well
settled that our normal practice is to set aside an election whenever an unfair labor practice
occurs during the critical [pre-election] period.. .") (emphasis added).
98. Action Mining, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 652, 654 (1995) ("A Passavantdisavowal adequate to remedy unfair labor practices within the critical period before a Board election is
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Gaines Electric

The Board generally holds that a repudiation sufficient to remedy an
unfair labor practice is also sufficient to restore the laboratory conditions
necessary for a valid representation election.98 The first Board case to reach
9 The employer in Gaines was alleged
that result was Gaines Electric Co."
to have violated the Act by issuing veiled threats to close its business because of its employees' union activities.1" The union claimed that because
this conduct occurred during the critical pre-election period,' 1 it had invalidated the election. '1 2
The Board assumed the employer had committed an unfair labor practice," 3 and thus focused on whether its subsequent attempt to repudiate its
conduct was sufficient to restore the conditions necessary for a valid election.0" The attempted repudiation took the form of a statement issued by
the company's president advising its employees, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is unlawful for me to threaten to close or sell the Company because of employees' union activities. You should disregard all
statements I may have made to you, which even created an imalso sufficient to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election.") (citing
Gaines Elec. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1081 (1992), and Agri-Int'l Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 925,
926-27 (1984)).
99. 309 N.L.R.B. at 1077.
100. Id. at 1080. For an academic discussion of this issue, see Claudia Wickham Lane,
Comment, Unfair Labor Practice and ContractAspects of an Employer's Desire to Close,
PartiallyClose, or Relocate BargainingUnit Work, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 285 (1985).
101. Gaines Elec. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1078, 1080.
102. Id. at 1077-78, 1080.
103. Id. at 1081. The Board has recently stated that "a threat of plant closure" is "arguably the most serious of all the 'hallmark' violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." Springs
Indus., 165 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1161, 1161 (2000); see also Pittsburgh & New England
Trucking Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 833, 833 (1980) ("A threat of loss of employment, whether
through plant closure, discharge, or layoff, is one of the most flagrant means by which an
employer can hope to dissuade employees from supporting a union."); Rapid Mfg. Co., 239
N.L.R.B. 465, 466 (1978) ("The Board has consistently viewed outright threats of plant closure as coercion of a most serious nature when made by an employer as a penalty for unionization."), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1968)).
104. Gaines Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1081. See generally Murcel Mfg. Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 623, 642 (1977) (indicating that a "threat about the plant closing in the event the
Union came in" can be "neutralized").
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pression in your mind that I was threatening you because you
were engaging in union activities.
I am repudiating any express or inferred threats to discontinue
business activity or impose unreasonable working conditions because I do not want any cloud to interfere with your rights and
the rights of your fellow employees to vote in a fair election run
by the National Labor Relations Board.
The Company assures you that it will not in any other manner
interfere with the rights you and other employees have which are
protected by the National Labor Relations Act. ' 5
The Board analyzed this statement under the Passavantstandards for
repudiating unfair labor practices.' ° It first noted that the repudiation was
timely, coming "reasonably promptly" after the allegedly unlawful conduct,0" and nearly two weeks before the election. m The Board concluded
that because the repudiation was also "reasonably consistent" with the
other Passavant requirements, it adequately remedied any unfair labor
practice the employer may have committed, and also restored in a timely
manner the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election.'"
2.

Action Mining

The Board addressed the impact of Passavantagain in Action Mining
Inc."° Upon receiving notice that the union had filed a certification petition,"' the employer in Action Mining began a campaign to discourage employee support of the union."' When the union subsequently lost the elec105. Gaines Elec., 231 N.L.R.B. at 1080.
106. Id. at 1081.
107. Id. See generally Greater Northland Area Local, 299 N.L.R.B. 858, 859 (1990)
(Oviatt, C., dissenting in part) ("The Board has required... that any repudiation - to be
effective - must be quite prompt.") (citing Red Arrow Freight Lines, 289 N.L.R.B. 227,
227 n.1 (1988)).
108. Gaines Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1081.
109. Id.
110. 318 N.L.R.B. 652 (1995).
111. Id. at 652, 660.
112. Id. at 666. Such a campaign does not, in and of itself, constitute an unfair labor
practice. See Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 488 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting
that "an employer is entitled to campaign against a union"). It may nevertheless provide the
basis for invalidating an election. See Gen. Knit of Cal., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 634 (1978)
(Murphy, B., dissenting) ("iT]he exercise of speech by a party may be the basis of a valid
objection to an election, if it violates 'laboratory conditions' even though the speech does
not constitute an unfair labor practice.") (quoting CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE ON THE NLRB,
INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMIMENDATIONS (1976), reprinted in 1976 LAB. REL. Y.B. 327,
338), overruledin Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1982).
113. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 659, 660.
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tion, it filed election objections1 3 alleging that the employer's commission
of unfair labor practices during the critical pre-election period'1 4 had invalidated the election."5 Those unfair labor practices included threats to shut
down operations if the union won the election," 6 interrogations of employees concerning their union sentiments,"7 and statements leading employees
to believe their organizational activities were under surveillance." 8
However, the employer argued that once these unfair labor practices
were brought to its attention, it promptly disavowed them in a posted notice
to employees."9 Among other things, the notice stated that any decision
concerning continued operations would not be premised on the outcome of
the election,' 2° that no employee would be disciplined or discharged for
supporting the union, 2 ' and that the company's supervisors had been instructed to cease interrogating... or engaging in any surveillance of its em114. Id. at 667.
115. Id. at 652.
116. Id. at 653, 661, 666; see supra note 103.
117. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 653, 661, 666. The Board has offered the following
explanation of why such interrogations may violate the Act:
[A]n employee is entitled to keep from his employer his views so that the employee may exercise a full and free choice on whether to select the Union, uninfluenced by the employer's knowledge or suspicion about those views and the
possible reaction toward the employee that his views may stimulate in the employer. That the interrogation might be courteous and low keyed instead of
boisterous, rude, and profane does not alter the case.
Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 167, 172 (1979), enforced, 613 F.2d 1338
(5th Cir. 1980).
118. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 653, 661, 666. An employer may violate section
8(a)(1) of the Act "by giving employees the impression that their union activities were under
surveillance." Meat Cleaver, 200 N.L.R.B. 960, 964 (1972); see also J.P. Stevens & Co.,
244 N.L.R.B. 407, 422 (1979) ("Section 7 of the Act protects employees in their right to
engage in union activity free of harassing expressions by supervision to the effect that the
'eyes and ears' of management are monitoring such conduct."); Borg-Warner Corp., 234
N.L.R.B. 1283, 1286 (1978) (asserting that an employer's conduct in "creating an impression of surveillance of its employees' union activities.., is plainly violative of the Act"),
enforced, 608 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1979).
119. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 652, 654, 661-62.
120. Id. at 662. See generally Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 488 (11th
Cir. 1982) (indicating that "it is not a violation [of the Act] to close a plant for legitimate
economic reasons").
121. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 662. See generally Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass'n
v. NLRB, 11 F.3d 302, 307 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Employers violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by threatening reprisals or discriminating against employees because they engage in
union or other activities protected by the Act or are suspected of doing so.").
122. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 662. But cf Crown Cork & Seal Co., 308 N.L.R.B.
445, 450 (1992) (concluding that a supervisor's "attempted assurance that [he] would not
insist on probing further into [an] area" was "not the equivalent of... repudiatinghis question" under Passavant).
123. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 662; cf Kawasaki Motors Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
1151, 1152 (1977) (finding that a "voluntary posting by the [employer] was adequate to ex-
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ployees.'" The notice also expressly disavowed any prior company statements to the contrary,' 4 and assured employees that the company would not
interfere with their organizational rights in the future.'"
The administrative law judge126 characterized this notice as "explicit
and detailed,"' 27 and indicated that if its "facial validity" was the only matter at issue, the employer had successfully disavowed its unfair labor practices.'" However, he found that the employer had committed additional unfair labor practices after posting the notice, 29 including some on the very
day of the election, 3 ' and that its attempted disavowal was therefore ineffective under Passavant."' Because the unlawful conduct he found to be
unremedied under Passavant32 occurred during the critical period between
punge the ill effects normally incident to surveillance activities").
124. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 662. See also Red Arrow Freight Lines, 289
N.L.R.B. 227, 227 n.1 (1988) (observing that "under Passavant the attempted repudiation.., must be specific to the [unlawful] conduct").
125. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 662. See also United Refrigerated Servs., 325
N.L.R.B. 258, 259 (1998) ("[T]he repudiation should give assurances to employees that the
employer will not interfere with their Section 7 rights in the future.") (citing Passavant).
126. Hearings involving alleged unfair labor practices and objections to representation
elections are ordinarily held before Board administrative law judges and hearing officers,
respectively, and their decisions are then subject to review by the Board itself. 29 C.F.R. §§
102.6, 102.15-16, 102.34, 102.45(a), 102.48(b), 102.69 (1999). However, "both the objection to the election and the unfair labor practice complaint [may] be consolidated for hearing
before the [administrative] law judge." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at
343 n.33 (citing Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 810 (1965), enforced in part,
367 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 1966)).
127. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 666. See also Red Arrow Freight Lines, 289
N.L.R.B. at 247 (noting that, in order to be effective under Passavant,an employer's repudiation of its unfair labor practices must be "clear and specific in nature") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
128. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 666; see also id. at 653 (noting that "the judge
found that the.., notice to the employees initially fulfilled the requirements for an effective
disavowal of the unfair labor practices").
129. Id. at 657, 666. There appears to have been no dispute that, after posting its disavowal notice, the employer continued communicating with employees as part of a
"planned, multi-staged campaign... to oppose the Union." Id. at 655. Again, that conduct
alone was not unlawful. See NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div. - Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188,
191 (4th Cir. 1967) (observing that "fairness in the elective process demands.., the opportunity of contesting parties to communicate their respective positions to the electorate").
130. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 657-58, 667.

131. It at 653, 667. See also Grocery and Food Prods., Processors, Canneries, Frozen
Food Plants, Sugar Processors, Confectionary and Candy Mfrs. and Distribs., 324 N.L.R.B.
1193, 1199 (1997) (noting that the Board in Passavant "insisted... that there be no proscribed conduct by the wrongdoer following publication").
132. The Board has stated that an employer's commission of additional unfair labor
practices "essentially vitiat[es] its earlier repudiation of... unlawful conduct." Intertherm,
Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1978), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 596

F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1979). Consistent with that view, the administrative law judge in Action
Mining found that the employer's purportedly unlawful post-repudiation conduct had "invalidated the disavowal notice." Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 653.
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the filing of the petition and the election,133 the judge recommended that the
election be set aside. 134
The Board agreed that the employer's disavowal was sufficient to repudiate the unfair labor practices it had committed prior to posting the notice, 13 ' but rejected the administrative law judge's finding that the employer's post-repudiation conduct violated the Act. 36 That conduct
essentially involved the employer's expression of opposition to the employees' selection of the union to represent them, 37 which the Board found
to be "lawful discussions of campaign issues."'38
Having found that the employer engaged in no further unlawful con-39
duct after posting a notice that satisfied Passavantin all other respects,
the Board held that the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election
had been restored, 40 citing Gaines Electric Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1992).
The Board in Action Mining also cited Agri-Int'l Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 925
(1984), which is discussed infra in Section V.A.4.' 4' the Board explained
that, as a matter of "Board law and policy," a repudiation sufficient to satisfy Passavant"is also sufficient to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election.', 42 It therefore rejected the administrative law
judge's recommendation that the election be set aside,' 43 and instead certified the election results.'"
3.

Galen Hospital Alaska

The Board reached a similar result in Galen Hospital Alaska. 41 The
employer in Galen was alleged to have interfered with the requisite laboratory conditions by threatening to cease regularly-scheduled wage in133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
134. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 667, 668, 683.
135. Id. at 654.
136. Id. at 653, 654.
137. Id. at 654.
138. Id. at 655; cf. Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 488 (1lth Cir. 1982)
("The employer may speak against unions in general or against the particular union seeking
representation .... ); NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1956) (observing
that an employer's "strong conviction[] against unions ... is not itself an unfair labor practice").
139. See Webco Indus., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 172, 173 (1998) (embracing a view of the
repudiation doctrine that requires "adherence to all the standards set forth in Passavant"),
enforced, 217 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2000).
140. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 658.
141. 309 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1992). The Board in Action Mining also cited Agri-Int'l Inc.,
271 N.L.R.B. 925 (1984), which is discussed infra in Section V.A.4.
142. Action Mining, 318 N.L.R.B. at 654.
143. Id. at 667-68, 683.
144. Id. at 653.
145. 327 N.L.R.B. 876 (1999).
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creases if the union prevailed in an impending election.' 46 The employer's
alleged threats took the form of comments made by its chief executive offi-

cer during a "captive audience" meeting 147 to the effect that, if the employees voted in favor of the union, any wage increases or other changes 1in
48
benefits would remain "status quo" until a union contract was negotiated.
The Board assumed, without deciding, that these statements were unlawful. 49 However, the Board relied upon Passavantand Gaines Electric
Co."0 in holding that, by issuing a written clarification to its employees on
the day after they were made, 5' the employer "took adequate steps to repudiate any improper implications of the statements and, by doing so, restored
the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair and valid election."'5 z
In reaching this conclusion, the Board noted that dissemination of the
clarification had been sufficient'53 because the employer made a reasonable
effort to provide it to all of the employees who had attended the original
group meeting. I" The Board explained that an employer's repudiation of
146. Id. at 876.
147. Id. For a general discussion of the implications of captive audience speeches made
during union election campaigns, see Note, NLRB Regulation of Employer's Pre-Election
Captive Audience Speeches, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1236 (1967).
148. Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 876 n.5; e4:Noah's Bay Area Bagels, LLC,
331 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 305, at *72-73 (May 22, 2000) (finding "comments to employees during a captive audience speech to be a coercive threat [that] they
[would] receive less favorable wages or other terms and conditions of employment if they
selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative").
149. Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877. The Board generally holds that "the
withholding of pay raises from employees who are awaiting the holding of a Board election
violates the Act if the employees otherwise would have been granted the pay raises in the
normal course of the employer's business." Progressive Supermarkets., Inc., 259 N.L.R.B.
512, 512 (1981). This rule has been extended to the withholding of benefits "subsequent to
the election but before certification, or after the certification has issued." Am. Telecomms.
Corp., Electromechanical Div., 249 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1137 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
150. 309 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1992).
151. The clarification stated, in pertinent part:
I was discussing what would happen with annual increases if the union won the
election. I need to make it clear that Alaska Regional will maintain the status
quo during any period of contract negotiations if the union won [sic]. That
means Alaska Regional would continue to give employees regularly scheduled
wage increases as it has done in the past. Whether such increases would continue under a union contract would be the subject of negotiations.
Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877.
152. Id.
153. Id. See also Grondorf, Field, Black & Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 996, 996 (1995) (noting
that Passavant requires "adequate publication of the repudiation to [the] employees involved").
154. Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877. The Board hearing officer concluded
that the employer had not given employees sufficient notice of the repudiation of its original
statements because, unlike the antiunion literature, its clarification was not "circulated...
throughout [the] facility." Id.; cf.Fashion Fair, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1435, 1444 (1966) ("[To
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prior coercive statements will satisfy Passavant'snotice requirement if it is
communicated in the same manner as the original unlawful statements. 55
4.

Agri-International and International Harvester

5 7
56
Despite the analysis in Gaines Electric and its progeny,' compliance with Passavantmay not be sufficient to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election in all cases. 8 This conclusion is sug-

gested by the analysis in Agri-Internatonal,59 a case in which the Board
nevertheless ultimately held that an employer's compliance with Passavant
was sufficient to restore laboratory conditions.' 6
In Agri-International,the employer committed a possible unfair labor
practice 6 when some of its supervisors began interrogating employees
about their votes in an upcoming representation election.'
Upon learning
16
of this potentially coercive conduct, the company's general manager both
posted and mailed to employees a disavowal notice describing the employees' rights under the NLRA,' 64 and pledging that, in the future, they would
be effective, a neutralization effort must be adequately publicized substantially to reach all
employees."). However, in Galen the Board rejected this analysis, noting that the employer's notice was adequate because the original statements "were made in a group setting-not on a facility-wide basis-and the retraction was directed to those in that group."
Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877.
155. Galen Hosp. Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877; cf Raysel-IDE, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 879,
881, 886 (1987) (rejecting an administrative law judge's conclusion that "only a generally
publicized statement of... repudiation" would suffice under Passavant).
156. 309 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1992).
157. Even in Gaines, the Board indicated that it was merely finding that laboratory conditions had been restored "in the circumstances of [that] case." Id. at 1081; cf. Galen Hosp.
Alaska, 327 N.L.R.B. at 877 (holding that the employer's repudiation had been sufficient
"under [the] circumstances").
158. As a general proposition, the Board approaches the question of whether laboratory
conditions existed on a case-by-case basis. See Lach-Simkins Dental Labs., Inc., 186
N.L.R.B. 671, 672 (1970); see also Amalagamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v.
NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (indicating that the determination of whether
"laboratory conditions have sufficiently deteriorated to require a rerun election" is a "delicate, fact-based determination that can be made only after careful weighing of all of the evidence").
159. 271 N.L.R.B. 925 (1984).
160. Id. at 927.
161. Id. at 926 (describing the employer's conduct as "unlawful").
162. Id. at 936; see supra note 117.
163. The Board has indicated that "interrogation of employees is not illegal per se," but
instead violates the Act only if "either the words themselves or the context in which they are
used... suggest an element of coercion or interference." Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B.
1176, 1177 (1984) (quoting Midwest Stock Exch. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255, 1267 (7th Cir.
1980)), affd sub nom. Hotel Employees Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.
1985).
164. Agri-Int'l, 271 N.L.R.B. at 926, 936. See also Dallas Times Herald, 315 N.L.R.B.
700, 710 (1994) (observing that "the Board has a strong interest in advising employees of
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not be asked how they were going to vote in an election." The notice was
also explained to employees in a series of meetings at which each of the
expressed their
supervisors who had been involved in the interrogations
'66
notice.
the
in
contained
assurances
the
to
commitment
The administrative law judge concluded that the employer's attempt to
voluntarily remedy its conduct was insufficient to prevent that conduct
from interfering with the employees' free and untrammeled choice in the
election,'67 even though its disavowal of the interrogations "clearly complied with all the Passavant standards, and.., effectively repudiated the
violation inherent in the otherwise coercive questioning of employees."" 6
The administrative law judge based this conclusion on the fact that the disavowal occurred only nine days before the election.' 69 He reasoned that this
did not provide sufficient time to dispel the coercive effects of the unlawful
interrogations. Id.; cf. Pilliod of Miss., Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 799, 809 (1985)
(finding that an employer's disavowal of its conduct "on the day before the
election" was "not timely").
The Board subsequently rejected this reasoning, and held that the repudiated interrogations did not invalidate the election.'7 ° The Board explained:
If, as the judge correctly concluded.... the [employer] effectively disseminated and communicated to its employees its strong
disavowal of the interrogation and gave assurances that there
would be no repetition of conduct interfering with the exercise of
the employees' [statutory] rights, it follows that in wiping the
slate clean by its disavowal the [employer] restored in timely
fashion the laboratory conditions which permitted the holding of
a valid election."'
The Board's analysis in Agri-International confirms that an employer's compliance with Passavantwill at least ordinarily be sufficient to
restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid representation election.

2

However, the case also suggests that there may be circumstances

their rights as they continue to work for the employer").
165. Agri-Int'l, 271 N.L.R.B. at 926, 936.
166. Id. at 926, 927. See also Lucky Stores, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1149 (1986) (discussing the importance "of ensuring that [the employer], in general, and [the supervisor], in
particular, understand exactly what conduct was improper and is to be avoided in the future").
167. Agri-Int'l, 271 N.L.R.B. at 938-39.

168. Id. at 938.
169. Id.
170. Agri-Int'l, 271 N.L.R.B. at 927.

171. Id.
172. See Oster Specialty Prods., 315 N.L.R.B. 67, 75 (1994) (noting that "the issue in
[Agri-Int'l] was whether, despite the employer's attempted repudiation, the employer's prior
conduct nevertheless constituted interference with the employees' free choice in an elec-
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under which an unfair labor practice would invalidate an election despite
having been fully remedied within the meaning of Passavant."'
In particular, the administrative law judge was correct in concluding
that the lingering effects of an unfair labor practice 74 can interfere with the
employee's free choice in the election." There is no reason to believe this
could not be true of an unfair labor practice that the employer had completely repudiated.1 76 In InternationalHarvester,7 for example, the Board
held that an employer's repudiation of its previous threat to withdraw bene79
fits if its employees unionized' had "no curative effect" on the election.
8 ° the Board explained that
Without specifically mentioning Passavant,'
"once [such] a threat is uttered it is very difficult at a later date to cure its
coercive effects."' 8
5.

Kawasaki Motors Corp.

Reasoning similar to that in InternationalHarvester Co. 82 also appears
in Kawasaki Motors Corp."3 The employer in Kawasaki committed nution") (emphasis omitted).
173. See Servomation of Columbus, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 504, 505-06 (1975) (stating that
where a party's misconduct "generates an atmosphere of fear and coercion which persists to
the date of the election and taints the conditions under which it is conducted," the election
will be set aside even if the misconduct itself has subsided "to the point where it was nonexistent at the time of the election").
174. Agri-Int'l, 271 N.L.R.B. at 938.
175. Id. at 939; cf.Master Slack Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 78, 84 (1984) (noting that an employer's "serious and flagrant unfair labor practices" can have "a possible long lasting effect
on the bargaining unit and ...discourage employees from supporting the Union").
176. See Oster Specialty Prods., 315 N.L.R.B. at 75 (referring to the issue of "whether [a
Passavant]repudiation was sufficient to avoid the lingering effects of objectionable conduct
which could interfere with the laboratory conditions of election").
177. 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1981).
178. Id. at 1162 n.3. See also Hamilton Avnet Elecs., 240 N.L.R.B. 781, 789 (1979)
(noting that "statements [which] threaten the loss of benefits should the employees select the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative ...are clearly violative of the Act").
179. Int'l Harvester,258 N.L.R.B. at 1162 n.3; cf.Natico, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 668, 687
(1991) (finding that an employer that had rescinded its unlawful pay cut did not "dispel the
lingering effects of its coercive conduct").
180. The hearing officer, whose report was omitted from the Board's published decision,
did discuss Passavant. Int'l Harvester,258 N.L.R.B. at 1162.
181. Int'l Harvester, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1162 n.3; cf. Louisburg Sportswear Co. 180
N.L.R.B. 739, 740 (1970) (finding that an employer's unfair labor practices "were of such a
pervasive character as to make it unlikely that their lingering effects could be neutralized"),
enforced in part and enforcement denied in part,462 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1972).
182. 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1982).
183. 257 N.L.R.B. 502 (1981). However, the repudiation at issue in Kawasaki may not
actually have satisfied Passavant,having been "very general" in nature, and accompanied
by claims that the employer was "innocen[t] of all wrongdoing." Id. at 519; cf.Chicago
Beef Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1056 (1990) (finding that an employer "failed to lawfully repudiate or cure its unfair labor practice" in part because its posted notice contained a "denial
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merous unfair labor practices during the critical pre-election period,'" most
of which involved threats of adverse consequences to employees if the union prevailed in the impending election. 5 When the union subsequently
lost the election, 86' it filed objections to the conduct of the election ' 7 contending that "these unfair labor practices disrupted conditions enabling a
free and uncoerced choice in the election."'8 3
Relying on FashionFair,Inc.,' 9 an earlier Board repudiation case that
90 the employer in Kawasaki argued
was cited with approval in Passavant,'
that "disclaimer" notices it had posted after committing the unfair labor
practices, in which it apparently assured its employees of "its intentions to
refrain from illegal activities in the future,"' 9' had eliminated any need for a
Board remedy.'9 2 However, the administrative law judge rejected this ar93
that
gument, concluding in accordance with the analysis in Fashion Fair'
the "severity, breadth, and variety" of the employer's unfair labor practices
"fatally detract[ed] from the good impact its disclaimers might have had to
dispel any lingering coercive effects among its employees."' 94
that it committed any unlawful act"), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991).
184. Kawasaki Motors, 257 N.L.R.B. at 519 (noting that the employer "engaged in numerous and serious unfair labor practices").
185. Id. at513.
186. Id. at 505.
187. Id. at 505, 513. These technically should have been objections to "conduct affecting the results of the election," 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1999), because it is "[tihe latter [that]
involve alleged misconduct by a party during the campaign leading up to an election and
frequently involve behavior that constitutes an independent violation of section 8 of the
Act." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 18, at 434-35. However, the error obviously was not fatal to the union's argument. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 234 N.L.R.B.
501, 502 (1978) ("Were we to close our eyes to objectionable conduct merely because a
party has failed to frame its objections properly. .. , we would make a mockery of our
pledge to preserve employee rights to a fair election.").
188. KawasakiMotors, 257 N.L.R.B. at 513.
189. 159 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1966).
190. Passavant Mem'l Area Hosp., 237 N.L.R.B. 138 at 138-39 (1978). Fashion Fair
appears to be the most significant pre-PassavantBoard decision addressing an employer's
right to voluntarily remedy its own unfair labor practices. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Intertherm,
Inc. 596 F.2d 267, 277 (1979) (asserting that FashionFairestablished "the general procedure an employer must follow to remedy an unfair labor practice").
191. KawasakiMotors, 257 N.L.R.B. at 519. In contrast to the Board's practice in other
repudiation cases, the actual language of the employer's posted notices is not set forth in
Kawasaki Motors. Cf. United States Postal Serv., 303 N.L.R.B. 463, 470 n.12 (1991) (noting that the "contents" of the notice at issue were "set forth in detail" in the Board's opinion).
192. KawasakiMotors, 257 N.L.R.B. at 519.
193. Fashion Fair,159 N.L.R.B. at 1444 ("Unless properly and effectively neutralized,
the impact of coercive action upon employees is not vitiated just because the illegal acts in
question are subsequently rescinded."); see also Borg-Warner Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 1283,
1286 (1978) (quoting and applying Fashion Fair), enforced, 608 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir.
1979).
194. KawasakiMotors, 257 N.L.R1B. at 519.
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Having thus concluded that the employer's unfair labor practices had
interfered with the laboratory conditions necessary for a "free and uncoerced choice on the question of representation," ' the administrative law
judge recommended that the election be set aside 96' because a remedy was
needed for the employer's "flagrant interference with the free choice of the
electorate, regardless of what the assurances against future wrongdoing
might have been.""' The Board subsequently agreed with this reasoning,'98
and adopted the administrative law judge's recommendation.'"
B.

Remedial Efforts That Do Not Satisfy Passavant

1.

International Automated Machines

An employer's attempt to repudiate its unfair labor practices may fail
to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election because
the repudiation did not satisfy Passavant.2 In InternationalAutomated
Machines,2' for example, the employer had promulgated a rule prohibiting
any employee solicitations on behalf of outside organizations on company
premises.2 The Board thus found that, having left its overly broad nosolicitation policy in effect for a substantial period after the election petition was filed, 3 the employer engaged in unlawful conduct that precluded
a valid election.'

195. Id.
196. Id. at 519, 520. In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 557 (1949), the
Board upheld the authority of its administrative law judges (who at that time were called
"trial examiners," see Avco Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 505, 505 n.1 (1972)) to "recommend the
setting aside of [an] election." Minnesota Mining, 81 N.L.R.B. at 560 n.15.
197. Kawasaki Motors, 257 N.L.R.B. at 519.
198. Id. at 502.
199. Id. at 502, 505.
200. See Colquest Energy, Inc., No. 10-CA-25009, 1992 NLRB LEXIS 642, at *39-40
(May 20, 1992) (asserting that in order "for any disavowal to be effective it must satisfy
Passavant's... standards") (emphasis added).
201. 285 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1987).
202. Id. at 1133.
203. In other words, the impact of the employer's unlawful policy was not "too remote to
have prevented the free choice guaranteed by Section 7." Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 1275, 1277 (1961).
204. Int'l Automated Machs., 285 N.L.R.B. at 1134. See also St.Vincent's Hosp., 265
N.L.R.B. 38, 42 (1982) ("We consider [an employer's] maintenance of [an unlawful] rule
over a [significant] period of [time] to be a serious restriction of the Section 7 rights of its
employees.").
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Autozone

A similar result was reached in Autozone.205 The union in that case
filed objections to an election it had lost by a "substantial" margin.3 6
Among other things, °7 the union alleged that approximately six weeks before the election,0' the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act' by
removing pro-union
literature
•
.
"*210 from company bulletin boards while leaving

anti-union literature posted.
The administrative law judge concluded that the employer's removal
of the union literature did violate section 8(a)(1).' However, the employer
argued that by reposting the material approximately three hours after its
removal, and apologizing to the employee who had complained about the

removal, 2'2 it had "effectively cured any unlawful infringement of [its] em-

205. 315 N.L.R.B. 115 (1994), enforced, 83 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1996).
206. Id. at 115. The employer's margin of victory may be relevant in assessing a union's
objection to a representation election. See NLRB v. Bostik Div., USM Corp., 517 F.2d 971,
975 n.5 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that "a closeness in election results has been recognized as
an important consideration" in determining whether laboratory conditions have been disturbed); Seaward Int'l, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 940, 942 n.13 (1985) (observing that where the
election results were "close," a party's alleged pre-election misconduct "must be closely
scrutinized").
207. The administrative law judge indicated that the principle issue in the case was
"probably ...whether [the employer] unlawfully announced to employees that, under the
law, it could not reach a final decision on a pay raise... because the Union had filed an
election petition to represent... employees." Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 115. Such conduct presumably would violate the "well settled" Board rule that "in deciding whether to
grant benefits while a representation election is pending, an employer should act as if no
union were in the picture." Reno Hilton, 320 N.L.R.B. 197, 206 (1995).
208. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 118, 119.

209. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
210. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 119-20, 145.
211. Id. at 120. The NLRB does not give employees an absolute right to post union literature on company bulletin boards. See NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256
(11th Cir. 1986); Group One Broad. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 993, 998 (1976). However, once an
employer permits its employees to use its bulletin boards for any purpose, Section 7 of the
Act guarantees their right to post union or other organizational materials. Union Carbide
Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1983). Thus, an employer's discriminatory removal of union literature from a bulletin board violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Container Corp. of Am., 244 N.L.R.B. 318, 318 n.2 (1979), enforced in part and enforcement
denied in part,649 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981).
212. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 120. An employer's apology for its unfair labor practices, without more, is generally insufficient to satisfy Passavant. See, e.g., Lucky Stores,
Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 647, 650 (1979) (concluding that an employer's letter of apology did not
satisfy Passavantbecause it did not constitute "an unambiguous repudiation of... [the]
unlawful conduct"). See also Fashion Fair, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1435, 1444 (1966) ("Merely
making an apology to employees for the misconduct committed [is] ambiguous and insufficient, without clearly identifying the wrongdoing, indicating recognition of the employees'
organizational rights, and assuring them against recurrence of the offenses committed.").
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ployees' Section 7 rights. 21 3
The administrative law judge rejected this argument, finding that "the
reposting did not effectively disavow the effects of the discriminatory re21 4 In particular,
moval under Passavant."
there was no evidence that the
employer had given its employees any assurances that it would not interfere
with their Section 7 rights in the future.1 5 In addition, the employer had
engaged in other unlawful conduct, 16 including issuing a "gag rule" prohibiting employees from discussing unions"7 as well as a series of coercive
threats that it would retaliate against employees if they unionized.1
Because the employer's conduct in removing the union literature from
its bulletin boards had not been effectively disavowed,219 the unfair labor
practice was not cured, 220 and the administrative law judge recommended
that the union's objection to the election be sustained.22 ' The Board ulti2 and, adopting
mately agreed with the judge's analysisM
his recommenda2
tion, n set the election aside and ordered that a new election be conducted .2
3.

Holly Farms

A comparable result was reached in Holly Farms,2 although that case
213. Autozone, Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 422, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *17 (6th
Cir. Apr. 24, 1996).
214. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 120; see also Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414,
at *17 ("In the instant case, [the employer's] conduct failed to meet the Passavant standards.").
215. Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *17. One Board administrative law
judge has stated that "absent some affirmative recognition by [an employer] that its past
conduct is improper and some expression of willingness not to repeat it, there is an everpresent danger that employees again will be subject to it and, indeed, may become the target
of more pernicious unlawful conduct." Lucky Stores, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1149
(1986).
216. Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *17 ("For a repudiation to be effective,
it must be ...free from other proscribed illegal conduct.").
217. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 123-24, 128. The Board noted that "the Section 7 right
to discuss union topics in an organizing campaign may not be prohibited while permitting
employees to discuss, during working time, virtually all other topics." Id. at 124 (citing
Visador Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1041-42 (1991)).
218. Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *17-18.
219. Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *17;Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 120.
220. Autozone, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14414, at *19.
221. Autozone, 315 N.L.R.B. at 145.
222. Id. at 115.
223. Id. at 146.
224. Id. at 115.
225. 311 N.L.R.B. 273 (1993), enforced, 48 F.3d 1360 (4th Cir. 1995), aft'd, 517 U.S.
392 (1996). For a previous academic discussion of Holly Farms, see Victoria V. Johnson,
Casenote, Did Old MacDonaldHave a Farm? Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 295 (1998).
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primarily involved the propriety of a post-election bargaining order under
Gissel Packing Co.,22 rather than the validity of the initial election.22' The
employer in Holly Farms was found to have violated sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Acte by granting a unilateral wage increase to bargaining unit
employees during the course of a union organizing campaign. 229 The employer contended that a speech given to its employees by a company vice
president, in which he "sought to justify the increase on economic grounds
and to put to rest 'the rumor' that the increase was given because of the
[pending]
election,"' had "negated any coercive effect of the wage in23'
crease."
The Board rejected the employer's argument. z The Board noted that
the vice president's speech did not contain any admission of wrongdoing,
as required by Passavant,233 nor did it occur "in an atmosphere free of other
unfair labor practices."2' The Board therefore agreed with the administra-

tive law judge's finding that the wage increase was unlawful2 5 and, together with the employer's other unfair labor practices,2 "precluded the
exercise of a free and uncoerced choice in the election. '237 In finding that
"the [employer's] unfair labor practices.., had the tendency to undermine
majority strength and impede the election process[]," thus making the
226. 395 U.S. 575 (1969); see supra note 64.
227. Holly Farms,311 N.L.R.B. at 280-82,361-63.
228. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3).
229. Holly Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 274, 327-28. Citing B & D Plastics, 302 N.L.R.B.
245 (1991) and Speco Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 439, 439 n.2 (1990), the Board drew "an inference of improper motivation and interference with employee free choice from all the evidence presented and from the [employer's] failure to establish a legitimate reason for the
timing of the increase." Holly Farms,311 N.L.R.B. at 274.
230. Id. at 274; cf.United Airlines Servs. Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. 954, 954 (1988):
It is well established that the mere grant of benefits during the critical [preelection] period is not, per se, grounds for setting aside an election.... In determining whether a grant of benefits is objectionable, the Board has drawn the
inference that benefits granted during the critical period are coercive, but it has
allowed the employer to rebut the inference by coming forward with an explanation, other than the pending election, for the timing of the grant or announcement of such benefits (citations omitted).
231. Holly Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 274.
232. Id.
233. Id. One Board administrative law judge recently described the admission of
wrongdoing as "the first element of the Passavanttest." Southwire Co., No. 26-CA-18725,
2000 NLRB LEXIS 660, at *99 (Sept. 26,2000).
234. Holly Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 274 (citing Farm Fresh, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 887, 887
n.1 (1991)).
235. Id. at 274-75, 326-28.
236. The administrative law judge, whose findings were ultimately affirmed by the
Board, id. at 273, found that the employer had committed "numerous unfair labor practices ... intended to undermine the Unions' majority status."
Id. at 354.
237. Id. at 361.
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holding of a fair election "unlikely,""8 the Board made the following observation:
[T]he grant of wage increases ha[s] a strong coercive effect on
employee freedom of choice because they eliminate primary reasons for organization. Additionally, wage increases.., have
been recognized as having a potential long-lasting effect, not
only because of their significance to employees, but also because
the Board's traditional remedies do not require a respondent to
withdraw benefits.3 9

4.

Fieldcrest Cannon

The Board appears to have reached a similar conclusion in Fieldcrest
Cannon."° After losing an election, ' the union in FieldcrestCannon filed
an objection alleging that the employer had engaged in unlawful surveillance of union meetings and campaign speeches. 2 The hearing officer concluded that the employer's "pervasive and purposeful" surveillance of its
employees had inhibited their attendance at these events, 3 and thereby interfered with the outcome of the election.2" The hearing officer recommended that the Board direct a new election. 5
The Board subsequently adopted the hearing officer's findings and
recommendation. 4 It noted that the employer's conduct was not limited to
"isolated actions by possibly overzealous supervisors which might have affected only a small portion of the voting unit. ' 247 The Board instead agreed

238. Id. at 282.
239. Id. at 281-82 (citations omitted).
240. 327 N.L.R.B. 109 (1998). However, the extent to which compliance with Passavant's repudiation requirements was specifically at issue in FieldcrestCannon remains unclear. See infra note 262.
241. FieldcrestCannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109.
242. Id. at 109 n.2.
243. Id. See also CBS Records Div., 223 N.L.R.B. 709, 709 (1976) (referring to the
"tendency" of surveillance "to affect the freedom to support or not to support the Union").
244. FieldcrestCannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109 n.2; cf Piggly Wiggly, Tuscaloosa Div.,
258 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1097 (1981) (stating that "surveillance ... is the type of conduct that
tends to have a 'lingering effect' on employees, and thus renders uncertain the possibility
of... fair and free... election[s]").
245. FieldcrestCannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109 n.2.
246. Id. at 109 n.3.
247. Id. at 109 n.2. An employer's surveillance of union activities may be "so isolated
that there is no basis for finding a violation of [section] 8(a)(1)." Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 70, 70 n.1 (1973); see, e.g., NLRB v. Orleans Mfg. Co.,
412 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding "two isolated incidents" that gave employees the
impression their union activities were under surveillance were "too innocuous to give rise to
a violation of § 8(a)(1)").
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with the hearing officer2 48 that the employer's unlawful surveillance of the
union meetings was pervasive 49 and, when coupled with its "failure to repudiate its conduct before the election," ° supported the hearing officer's
recommendation." ' The Board therefore
set aside the original election and
2
directed that a new election be held.
5.

Action Mining

As discussed earlier,2 3 the administrative law judge in Action Mining held that the employer failed to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election because its attempt to repudiate its unfair labor
practices was insufficient under Passavant.255 Although the Board subsequently held that the employer's repudiation had been effective, 2 6 its focus
on that issue suggests agreement with the judge's conclusion that a repudiation that did not satisfy Passavant would have been insufficient to restore the requisite laboratory conditions."'

248. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
249. FieldcrestCannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109 n.2. With respect to this issue, the Board
had previously made the following observation:
[O]pen surveillance of a union meeting by top officials of an employer... is a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; this is so because it is calculated, and
reasonably tends, to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7. Such open surveillance cannot be characterized as isolated conduct because by its very nature it not only directly affects the employees subjected to the surveillance, whatever their number, but
also is calculated to, and potentially does, affect all employees in the plant.
Shovel Supply Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 315, 316 (1957) (footnote omitted).
250. FieldcrestCannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109 n.2. It is not clear from the Board's opinion whether the employer made no attempt to repudiate its unlawful surveillance, or instead
simply failed to satisfy Passavant. Compare St. Vincent's Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 38, 42
(1982) (discussing an employer that "made no effort to repudiate its [unlawful] conduct"),
with Bay Area-L.A. Express, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1063 n.1 (1985) (holding that an employer's "attempt to repudiate" its unlawful conduct was "not effective" under Passavant).
251. Fieldcrest Cannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109 n.2. See also Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 371
F.2d 787, 788 (4th Cir. 1967) (indicating that the "coercive effect" of an employer's unlawful surveillance of union meetings can be removed "only if the employer.., clearly inform[s] all of its employees of its disavowal of what.., had [been] done").
252. Fieldcrest Cannon, 327 N.L.R.B. at 109-10, n.3.
253. See supra notes 110-44 and accompanying text.
254. 318 N.L.R.B. 652 (1995).
255. Id. at 666-67.
256. Id. at 654.
257. Id. at 658 (concluding that "the laboratory conditions.., remained intact" because
the employer's "Passavantrepudiation... [was] effective").
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Bell Halter, Wireways, and Mariner Post-Acute Network

In contrast to the foregoing cases, 7 there is also Board authority
holding that the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election can be
9 In
restored by an attempted repudiation that does not satisfy Passavant.2
26
Bell Halter, for example, the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act 61 by maintaining and enforcing an overly broad no-solicitation rule that
prohibited any employee distributions of literature on company premises
without authorization.2 6' The employer argued that by subsequently distributing a notice advising employees that they could, in fact, "distribute
literature on their own time (lunch, before work, etc.) in non-work areas
such as the cafeteria or parking lot,, 263 it had successfully repudiated its
unlawful conduct.'
The Board rejected this argument," holding that the employer's attempted repudiation did not satisfy Passavant.' In particular, the notice
failed to specifically repudiate the employer's unlawful no-solicitation
rule, or assure employees that the employer would not subsequently inter258. See supra notes 201-69 and accompanying text.
259. In addition, in a case in which the Board did not specifically address whether the
laboratory conditions necessary for a valid initial election had been restored, but instead
considered whether the employer's unlawful conduct precluded a valid second election, the
employer's "efforts to ameliorate the effects of its unlawful conduct" were held to have
"tip[ped] the balance... against a finding that a fair election would be rendered impossible," even though the attempted repudiation was not sufficient to "warrant... finding no
violation of the Act under the test in Passavant." Almet, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 626, 629 &
n.14 (1991).
260. 276 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1985).
261. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
262. Bell Halter,276 N.L.R.B. at 1211, 1213-14, 1223.
263. Id. at 1212. Cf St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. N.L.R.B., 871 F.2d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1989)(indicating that "an employer may validly prohibit solicitation and distribution in
working areas") (citing Restaurant Corp. of Am. v. N.L.R.B., 827 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
264. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1213.
265. Id. at 1214. See also St. Vincent's Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 38, 42 (1982) (holding that
an employer's "mere revision of [an unlawful] rule does not constitute an effective repudiation").
266. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1214. But see AU. Forest Prods., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B.
855, 872 & n.13 (1987) ("[W]hen unlawful restrictions on in-plant solicitation have been
promptly rescinded, the Board has found such violations 'effectively cured' even when
[Passavant's]conditions have not been met.").
267. Bell Halter,276 N.L.R.B. at 1213. Cf.MPG Transp., Ltd., 315 N.L.R.B. 489, 489
n. I (1994) (finding that an attempted repudiation was insufficient under Passavantbecause
it "did not refer to the initial [unlawful conduct] and specifically deny its substance"), enforced, 91 F.3d. 144 (6th Cir. 1996); Hoyt Water Heater Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1357
(1987) (finding that an employer's no-solicitation rule was unlawful even though the employer "did not enforce the rule," because the employer "failed to apprise the employees of
any repudiation of the rule").
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fere with their statutory rights. 26 While acknowledging that Passavantis
not to be applied in a "highly technical or mechanical manner,"' 69 the Board
explained:
In the eyes of the employees, [the no-distribution rule] remains
intact and unaffected by [the subsequent] notice. The effect of
the notice is simply to create the impression among employees of
benevolence on the part of [the employer] in authorizing that
which it could not under normal circumstances have lawfully
prohibited in any event. Rather, by granting authorization for
lawful distributions, [the employer's] notice suggests that
authorization is not a matter of right and is subject to with-

drawal.' 0
However, the Board rejected the union's argument that because the
employer's unremedied unfair labor practice occurred during the critical
pre-election period, it destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary for a
valid election,' and thus invalidated the vote rejecting the union."2 The
Board indicated that the employer's attempt to repudiate its unlawful policy
was the "most significant relevant factor" in determining whether the policy had affected the outcome of the election. 273 The attempted repudiation
complied with most of the Passavantrequirements, 4 and notified employees that they "would not be in violation of any existing [company] rule in
undertaking union distributions in appropriate areas on [the company's]
premises. ' 27' Thus, although the repudiation did not satisfy PassavantY it
268. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1213-14. See also Laverdiere's Enters., 297 N.L.R.B.
826, 831 n.11 (1990) (noting that "the Board's test for repudiation of unlawful conduct" requires the employer to "assure the employees of the free exercise of their statutory rights").
269. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1213 (quoting Broyhill Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1366
(1982)).
270. Id. See also Baldor Elec. Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 614, 615 (1979) ("[U]nder Board law,
the Employer must show that it informed the employees generally that it no longer had an
invalid no-solicitation/no-distribution rule, and that henceforth it would only enforce a valid
rule."); Bellinger Shipyards, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 620, 623 (1976) (asserting that an employer's "rescission of [an] unlawful [no-solicitation] rule should be accomplished with at
least as much ceremony as its enforcement of the old [rule].").
271. Bell Halter,276 N.L.R.B. at 1223.
272. Id. at 1208.
273. Id. The Board had stated in a previous case that the determination of whether an
employer's unfair labor practices "could have affected the results of the election" is based
upon "the number of violations, their severity, the extent of dissemination, the size of the
[bargaining] unit, and other relevantfactors." Super Thrift Mkts. Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 409,
409 (1977) (emphasis added).
274. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1213. In particular, the Board noted that the employer's notice was timely, unambiguous, adequately published, and "specific regarding the
incident which gave rise to the notice." Id. In addition, there was no evidence of "further
restrictions on employee distribution rights." Id.
275. Id. at 1223.
276. Id. at 1214.

408

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:2

was sufficient to render the employer's unlawful conduct "de minimis insofar as having an impact on the election.,,277 The Board therefore certified the
election results.27
In Wireways, Inc.,279 the employer had promulgated a rule prohibiting
its employees from distributing union literature during breaks."0 The administrative law judge found that this rule violated section 8(a)(1).2 However, he also concluded that by verbally retracting the rule several days
later,2 2 and posting a notice stating that "employees may distribute literature in non-working areas as long as this is not done when you are supposed to be working or in a manner which would interfere with the work of
other employees," 3 the employer had "effectively repudiated the restriction on employees' Section 7 rights" and thus "corrected" its unlawful conduct.24 The judge therefore found no need to recommend a further Board
remedy.
The Board disagreed with this analysis, holding that "the alleged re6 It
pudiation was ambiguous and, therefore, ineffective" under Passavant.2
therefore issued a cease-and-desist order, and required the employer to post
a remedial notice. 2 7 The Board nevertheless certified the election results,2
expressing no disagreement with the administrative law judge's conclusion
that the employer's retraction of its unlawful no-distribution rule was sufficient to avoid invalidation of the election 9 even though the retraction was
277. Id. at 1223; cf. Bellinger Shipyards, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 620, 620 (1976) (finding
that the employer's "unlawful no-solicitation rule" had been "so substantially remedied by
the [employer's] subsequent conduct that the entire situation [was] one of little significance"). See also Lucky Stores, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1149 (1986) (indicating that
whether the employer "repudiated its unlawful conduct" is the issue of "perhaps the greatest
significance" in applying the de minimis doctrine).
278. Bell Halter, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1208. But see Baldor Elec. Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 614,
615 (1979) ("Where... the Employer has invalid no-solicitation/no-distribution rules which
have been published and distributed to all employees and thereafter enforced by the Employer against some employees, it is necessary, in order to assure a free election, that the
Employer generally repudiate the rule to all employees.").
279. 309 N.L.R.B. 245 (1992).
280. Id. at 249.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 253.
284. Id. at 249.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 245. The Board noted that "[e]ven assuming... that the other [Passavant]
conditions have been met," neither the verbal retraction nor the posted notice "made specific
reference to the distribution of union literature." Id.; cf. Farm Fresh, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 887,
887 n.1 (1991) (finding an employer's attempted repudiation "ineffective under Passavant
because it did not refer to or acknowledge the unlawful [conduct].").
287. Wirevays, 309 N.L.R.B. at 245.
288. Id. at 246.
289. Id. at 253-54. The Board found it unnecessary to reach this issue because the employer's promulgation of the rule "did not occur during the critical [pre-election] period."
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2 ,0
not sufficient to obviate the need for a Board remedy under Passavant.
Significantly, the judge, in concluding that the election results were valid, 9'
made the following observations with which the Board expressed no disagreement:
[A]n 8(a)(1) violation is not a fortiori conduct requiring the election be set aside. The Board does not apply a per se rule.
Moreover conduct critical enough to be considered objectionable
to an election atmosphere may be de minimus [sic] and thus not
require setting the election aside.... Applying the Board's reasoning to the instant case the alleged unfair labor practices,
whether meritorious or not, do not constitute conduct sufficient to
set the election results aside. 2

A similar result is also suggested by the analysis in Mariner PostAcute Network Inc.2 3 The employer in Mariner was alleged to have engaged in conduct that interfered with its employees' free choice in an election2' by sending a letter to all eligible voters purporting to advise them of
the "negative aspects of unionization." 95 The Board held that this letter,
which warned the employees that they might lose their jobs if unionization
ultimately led to a strike, 2"6 improperly interfered with the election because
Id. at 245 n.2. In considering election objections, it is generally "the Board's policy to look
only to objectionable conduct occurring between the time the petition is filed and the election is held." Long-Airdox Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1157, 1159 (1985). However, the Board occasionally may "take into account actions occurring outside the critical period, to the extent
that they add meaning or context to the days and weeks leading up to the election." NLRB
v. Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1997).
290. Wireways, 309 N.L.R.B. at 245.
291. Id. at 254.
292. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
293. 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308 (1999).
294. Marinermay be an example of a representation case in which the employer's alleged interference with the requisite laboratory conditions did not actually rise to the level of
an unfair labor practice. Id. at 1309 n.4 (noting that the Board hearing officer had incorrectly referred to the employer's "violations," rather than to its "objectionable conduct").
See also Life Savers, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1257 (1982) ("It has long been held that conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, afortiori, conduct which interferes with the laboratory
conditions of an election. The reverse situation is not necessarily true, however, since Section 8(a)(1) must be read in conjunction with the [employer free speech] provisions of Section 8(c).") (citation omitted).
295. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1308. See also Life Savers,

264 N.L.R.B. at 1257, which states:
[A]n employer is free to communicate to its employees its views concerning the
consequences of unionization so long as the communications do not contain a
threat of reprisal of force or promise of benefit, and so long as the prediction of
the effects of unionization is based on objective facts.
(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)
296. Specifically, the objectionable portion of the letter stated: "LOST JOBS: The...
Union could mean some... employees lose their jobs. When the union went on strike at
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it did not adequately explain the consequences of an economic strike2" and
the reinstatement rights of economic strikers. 8 Citing Larson Tool &
Stamping Co.,299 the Board explained:
If an employer tells employees that they may lose their jobs if
they go on strike, without informing them that permanently replaced strikers who make unconditional offers to return to work
have the right to full reinstatement when positions become available and to be placed on a preferential hire list if positions are not
available, the statement is objectionable because it conveys the
prospect of total job loss.3"
The employer argued that it had sufficiently explained the reinstatement rights of economic strikers in mandatory employee meetings held
shortly after the letter was sent."' In those meetings, the employer had explained that it could hire permanent replacements in the event of an economic strike,3° and also indicated that at the conclusion of such a strike the

Demopolis, the nursing home hired new employees, and when the strike ended, many of the
union's supporters had no jobs to which to return." Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1308 (emphasis omitted); cf. Hajoca Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 104, 106
(1988) (holding that a statement that employees "would lose theirjobs if they participated in
an economic strike" violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it "constitute[s] a threat to
sever the employment relationship should the employees exercise rights protected by Section 7").
297. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1308. But see Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 515, 515-16 (1982) (rejecting the contention that an employer
"who informs employees that they are subject to replacement in the event of an economic
strike" must "explicate all the.., consequences of being an economic striker").
298. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1308 (citing Laidlaw Corp.,
171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969)). See also Keller Mfg.
Co., 272 N.L.R.B. 763, 786 (1984) ("Economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement upon
application and if their prestrike positions are filled at the time of application, they retain the
right to their former position when it becomes vacant.") (emphasis omitted).
299. 296 N.L.R.B. 895 (1989).
300. Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309; cf Larson, 296
N.L.R.B. at 895:
The Board's legitimate concern with protecting an employer's right to discuss
potentially unfavorable aspects of unionization does not extend so far as to
sanction propaganda that overtly raises the prospect of job loss and leaves employees on their own to divine that the "loss" is somehow less than total because
it is conditioned by a right to return to work after the replacement's departure.
301. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309.
302. Id. See P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 894, 897 (1987) ("Since NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938), it has been the settled rule
that an employer may hire permanent replacements for [its] workers who are striking... to
force compliance with the union's collective-bargaining demands (economic strikes)."). For
the author's previous discussion of an employer's right to permanently replace economic
strikers, see Michael D. Moberly, Striking Bargains:The At-Will Employment of Permanent
Strike Replacements, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167 (2000).
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strikers are permitted to return to work "only when openings occur." 303
The Board rejected the employer's argument, 3 4 holding that its letter
"had a... tendency to coerce employees" and thus "interfere with their
free choice in the election," 305 even when considered in conjunction with
the employer's statements at the subsequent employee meetings 0 6 Because the employer did not actually discuss its letter during those meetings,
the Board concluded that the employer had not effectively repudiated the
objectionable statements contained in the letter. However, in concluding
that there had been no effective repudiation under the circumstances at issue, the Board suggested that it may not always be necessary for an employer to comply with "all of the requirements for repudiation.., set forth
in Passavant"in order to restore the laboratory conditions necessary for a
valid election."5
Both this suggestion and the comparable results in Bell Halter,Inc.304
303. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309; cf Bio-Sci. Labs., 209
N.L.R.B. 796, 803 (1974) (stating that employers are "under no obligation to create positions for [permanently] replaced [economic] strikers by discharging their replacement[s] at
the termination of the strike"). See also Atlas Metal Parts Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 205, 205
(1980) ("An employer's responsibility to reinstate an economic striker is limited to the employer's legitimate and substantial staffing requirements.").
304. MarinerPost-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309. However, the Board
noted that the employer's statements at the meetings were not themselves alleged to have
been objectionable. Id.; cf. Santa Rosa Blueprint Serv., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 762, 763 (1988)
("The Board has held that an employer who truthfully informs employees of the possibility
of being permanently replaced during a strike, but fails to explain all of the possible consequences of such replacement,... does not violate Section 8(a)(l).").
305. Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309; cf. Miss. Extended
Care Ctr., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1082 (1973) (asserting that an employer's "inaccurate
statements concerning the absolute right to permanently replace employees who went on
strike... clearly constituted improper interference with [its] employees' right to exercise a
free choice as to a union representative or vote").
306. Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309. See also UARCO,
Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 55, 58 (1987):
In evaluating [an employer's] preelection campaign, we begin from the premise
that the oral and written statements must be construed together to determine
their reasonable tendency to coerce the employees. Both the courts and the
Board have long held that statements and written materials must be viewed in
context and not in isolation.
(Citations omitted.)
307. Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309, n.3. The Board in
Mariner explained: "Because the Employer did not acknowledge, let alone repudiate, the
improper implications of the 'Lost Jobs' statements, it of course did not assure the employees that [it] would not engage in objectionable conduct in the future." Id.at 1309. See also
Fashion Fair, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1435, 1444 (1966) (indicating that an employer's attempted
repudiation is "insufficient" unless it "clearly identiflies] the wrongdoing ... and assur[es] ... against recurrence of the offenses committed").
308. Mariner Post-Acute Network, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309 n.3 (discussing the
view of Member Hurtgen).
309. 276 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1985).
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and Wireways, Inc. 3t0 are consistent with the Board's analysis in other representation cases.3 In particular, the Board has indicated that an election
will not be set aside unless the employer's unfair labor practices were "sufficiently widespread as to have effected the conduct of the election."31 2 In
other words, "de minimis" unfair labor practices occurring during the preelection period do not interfere with the laboratory conditions necessary for
a valid election,3 3 even if the employer makes no effort to repudiate
them.3 4 And if the existence of unremedied unfair labor practices does not
necessarily preclude a finding that an election was valid,3 '5 the fact that an
employer's attempted repudiation of its unfair labor practices did notfully
remedy them3 6 obviously should not preclude such a finding.3 7
The analysis in Mariner,Bell Halter and Wireways is also correct as a
matter of policy.38 In particular, both the Board1 9 and the judiciary have
310. 309 N.L.R.B. 245 (1992).
311. See Yellow Taxi Co. of Minn., 262 N.L.R.B. 702, 705 (1982) (Zimmerman, D.,
concurring) (noting that "the parties who depend on the processes of the NLRB deserve
consistent and predictable decisions"). But see Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-60130, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 12694, at *29 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997) (Garza, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Board's task in an election challenge is not a quest for on-point precedent, but to make an ad
hoe determination based on the facts presented.").
312. Oster Specialty Prods., 315 N.L.R.B. 67, 75 n.13 (1994) (emphasis omitted) (citing
Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 258, 259 n.13 (1987)); cf. Miss. Valley
Structural Steel Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1132 n.2 (1972) (rejecting the proposition that a
pre-election violation of section 8(a)(1) will invalidate the election "regardless of its lack of
impact on the results").
313. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; cf 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, sitpra note 18, at 339 (observing that "conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice will
almost always also violate the Board's election rules") (emphasis added).
314. Gray Line of the Black Hills, 321 N.L.R.B. 778, 793 (1996) ("Ordinarily, though
not universally, commission of unfair labor practices during the preelection period.., is
conduct which warrants setting aside the election and conducting a second one.") (emphasis
added); Detroit Edison Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 564, 565 n.7 (1993) (noting one Board member's
disagreement with the contention that "the commission of an employer's unfair labor practice will almost always result in the overturning of an election").
315. Gasko & Meyer, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 658, 660 (1981) (observing that "not every unfair labor practice.., is of such significance as will cause the election to be set aside"); cf.
Guerdon Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 665 (1975) (Kennedy, R., dissenting) ("It is not
every unfair labor practice which nullifies an employer's right to an election.").
316. The issue under Passavantis whether the employer "has.. . entirely cured its unfair
labor practice." Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1086 (1990) (emphasis added),
affid sub nom. Gen. Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1991); see also F.L. Thorpe & Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 147, 151 n. 11 (1994) (noting that Passavant addresses whether the unfair labor practice was "completely remedied"), enforced in
part and rev'd in part,71 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1995).
317. See, e.g., Ga. Hosiery Mills, 207 N.L.R.B. 781, 785 (1973) (finding that an unfair
labor practice that had only been "substantially" remedied was "at best a de minitnus
[sic]... violation"). But cf. Raysel-IDE, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1987) (concluding
that an employer's violation of section 8(a)(1) was "not de minimis" where its remedial efforts were "inadequate to repudiate effectively [its unlawful] conduct" under Passavant).
318. The Board in Bell Halter indicated that, as a matter of policy, "voluntary remedial
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expressed the view that "self-initiated remedies... should be encouraged
whenever possible,"3' 20 because voluntary compliance with the law is
deemed to be "a prerequisite to the continued efficacy of the National Labor Relations Act."3' 2 A strict application of Passavant in representation
cases (and, for that matter, in other contexts)y conflicts with this policy by
discouraging employers from attempting to remedy their unfair labor practices.3"
4
While these policy concerns have prompted criticism of Passavant,
3
Passathe Board recently declined to abandon its holding in that case.
3 26
"the law on the issue of repudiavant thus remains, at least for now,
action by employers is to be encouraged." Bell Halter, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1213
(1985).
319. See, e.g., Agri-Int'l Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 925, 937 (1984) (quoting Broyhill with approval); Broyhill Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1367 (1982) (indicating that "voluntary action by
employers" to "disavow ... unlawful conduct" is "encouraged by [the] Board").
320. NLRB v. Intertherm, Inc., 596 F.2d 267, 277 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Kawasaki
Motors Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 502, 519 (1981) (stating "Board precedent indicating the
Board's approval of an employer's efforts to halt the effects of its own illegal activity")
(footnote omitted).
321. National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 521, 530 (1979); see also George
Washington Univ. Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1363 (1977) (Walther, P., dissenting in part)
("Parties should be encouraged voluntarily to put themselves in compliance with the Act.")
(citing Deringer); Bellinger Shipyards, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 620, 620 (1976) (quoting and
adopting the rationale of Deringer); Deringer Mfg. Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 622, 628 (1973)
("[The employer] voluntarily put itself in compliance with the Act. It is considered that
such voluntarily [sic] action should be encouraged."); Bakery Drivers Local 276, 100
N.L.R.B. 1092, 1098 (1952) ("Needless to say, voluntary compliance with the Act should be
encouraged . ").
322. See, e.g., Natico, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 668, 684, 687 (1991) (considering the impact
of Passavanton an employer's right to withdraw recognition of an incumbent union's status
as collective bargaining representative). For the author's discussion of Passavant'sapplication in yet another context, see Michael D. Moberly, Striking a Happy Medium: The Conversion of UnfairLabor Practice Strikes to Economic Strikes, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab.
L. 131 (2001).
323. See Webco Indus. v. NLRB, 217 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that "reliance on Passavant... may discourage prompt relief by an employer");
Webco Indus., 327 N.L.R.B. 172, 175 (1998) (Hurtgen, P., dissenting in part) ("Passavant
discourages prompt relief. If an employer.., stubs its toe on one of the conditions, its
prompt relief will be of no avail. The result is that prompt remedial action is frequently
avoided .... ."), enforced, 217 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2000).
324. See, e.g., Webco Indus., 327 N.L.R.B. at 173 (discussing a Board member's contention that Passavantshould be overruled); Galen Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 876, 877
n.6 (1999) ("Member Hurtgen does not necessarily agree with all of the requirements for
repudiation, as set forth in PassavantMemorialHospital.").
325. See Webco Indus., 327 N.L.R.B. at 173 (observing that the argument for overruling
Passavant"fails to persuade us"); cf. Local 1-2, Utility Workers of America, 312 N.L.R.B.
1143, 1144 n.5 (1993) (rejecting an argument that would have required the Board to "disavow the test set out in Passavant... for effective repudiation of [unlawful] conduct").
326. It is not uncommon for the Board's view of an issue to change with changes in its
membership. See Epilepsy Found. N.E. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
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tion."327 Nevertheless, one administrative law judge has indicated that there
is some flexibility in the case's application, depending on the circumstances under which it is being invoked.3
The Board itself expressed a similar view in Broyhill Co. ,3 where it
specifically declined to apply Passavant "in a highly technical and mechanical manner., 330 A number of other Board decisions likewise "give
credit to [an employer] who ameliorates its unfair labor practices even
though the effort does not meet the strict requirements of Passavant.' , 33 As
demonstrated by the analysis in Bell Halter,Inc.,332
this flexible approach to
the application of Passavantis also likely to be taken in at least some representation cases.333
VI. CONCLUSION

Satisfaction of the Passavant requirements is not determinative of
whether an employer's repudiation of its unfair labor practices has restored
the laboratory conditions necessary for a valid election. 334 Although compliance with Passavant will ordinarily be sufficient to restore laboratory
conditions,335 that may not be true in all cases.336 In addition, an employer's

2001) ("It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the changing composition of the Board."). As one court has noted,
"[o]ne need not pejoratively characterize the Board as a politically pliable agency to recognize that existing Board precedent is inevitably, and necessarily, subject to some modification as the composition of the Board changes in response to electoral developments."
Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F. Supp. 256, 264 (D.D.C. 1982).
327. Raysel-IDE, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1987); see also High Energy Corp., 259
N.L.R.B. 747, 756 (1981) (noting that "[tihe law concerning repudiation is summarized in
Passavant").
328. Dallas Times Herald, 315 N.L.R.B. 700, 710 (1994).
329. 260 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1982).
330. Id. at 1366; cf. Ambulette Transp. Serv. Corp., 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1044, 1044
(1987) (discussing dissenting Board Chairman's willingness "to ignore entirely that [an employer's] attempted rescission of [an unlawful] termination [did] not meet the standards set
forth in Passavant... for an effective repudiation of past unlawful conduct").
331. Dallas Times Herald, 315 N.L.R.B. at 710.
332. 276 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1985).
333. See, e.g., Gaines Elec. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1081 (1992) (holding that a repudiation that was "reasonably consistent with the Passavantstandard" was sufficient "to restore.., the laboratory conditions for a fair election").
334. This observation is also undoubtedly applicable to a union's efforts to repudiate
unlawful pre-election conduct. See supra note 18; compare Teamsters Local 738 (E.J.
Brach Corp.), 324 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1199-1200 (1997) (discussing a union's failure "to repudiate its unlawful conduct in the manner prescribed by Passavant"), with Local 1-2, Utility
Workers of America, 312 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144 n.5 (1993) (referring to the hypothetical
situation in which "a union.., met the Passavant standard").
335. See supra notes 98-173 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 174-200 and accompanying text.
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failure to comply with Passavant,while also potentially significant,3 ' does
not necessarily compel the setting aside of an election that was potentially
tainted by the employer's commission of pre-election unfair labor practices.333
This flexible treatment of the impact of employer repudiation efforts is
consistent with the Board's general approach to determining whether laboratory conditions existed during a representation election. 339 That approach
involves an ad hoc,3° case-by-case appraisal of the employer's (or union's)
objectionable conduct ' to determine whether it "substantially interfered
with the election."'' 2 As the Board has stated: "[W]e must evaluate the circumstances with due regard to the realities, and consider.., the total factual picture within the frame of reference [in] which the election was held,
that necessarily must intrude themselves in
and the many facts and factors
343
making a sound judgment."
337. See supra notes 201-69 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 270-345 and accompanying text. Indeed, one court has cited empirical evidence suggesting that "far from causing the employees to vote against the union,"
an employer's commission of unfair labor practices during an election campaign actually
causes employees "to appreciate that they need a union, and consequently improve[s] the
union's chances of winning in a secret ballot." NLRB v. Lovejoy Indus., 904 F.2d 397, 401
(7th Cir. 1990) (discussing JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAw AND REALITY (Russell Sage Found. 1976)).
339. The Board has indicated that its test for determining whether laboratory conditions
exist is not "fixed and immutable." Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70, supplemented,
140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962); see also Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 240 (1975) (Penello,J.
dissenting) (stating that "the 'laboratory conditions' standard... is binding upon the Board
and the courts only until such time as the Board chooses to change it"); cf. Leonard Bierman, Judge Posnerand the NLRB: Implicationsfor Labor Law Reform, 69 MINN. L. REv.
881, 899 n.105 (1985) (asserting that "[tihe NLRB's application of its laboratory-conditions
doctrine has not been entirely consistent"); Julius Getman, LaborLaw andFree Speech: The
Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 11 n.41 (1984) (noting that "the
NLRB has been inconsistent in its adherence to the laboratory conditions standard").
340. See Lovejoy Indus., 904 F.2d at 402 ("A jurisprudence of 'I know it when I see
it' ... approximates if it does not wholly capture the Board's approach to how much coercion spoils an election .... "); Lach-Simkins Dental Labs., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 671, 672
(1970) ('Ve... treat each situation as it arises on its own merits.").
341. See supra note 158; see also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers v. NLRB,
736 F.2d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("In carrying out the NLRA's goal of ensuring employee free choice, the Board must ... consider carefully... the circumstances surrounding
the original election.... ."); V.I.P. Limousine, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 641, 641 (1985) (observing
that "the Board must assess whether the particular circumstances... destroy[ed] the requisite laboratory conditions under which elections must be conducted"); King, supra note 19,
at 192 (noting that "the Board [has] espoused a case-by-case analysis of all the factual circumstances in determining the legality of [an employer's pre-election] conduct").
342. Jennie-O Foods, Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. 305, 341 (1991); see also Waste Stream Mgmt.,
Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1088, 1133 (1994) (indicating that "the standard for interference necessary to set aside a board-conducted election is substantial interference with 'laboratory conditions"').
343. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 135, 139 (1954); see also Archer Laundry Co.,
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The Board's treatment of employer repudiations in the election context is also consistent with its current view of Passavant,which holds that
the requirements of that case are not to be applied "mechanistically,'" but
flexibly depending upon the circumstances of the particular case.345 Thus,
and perhaps most importantly, the Board's flexible treatment of the repudiation issue has the benefit of encouraging, or at least not discouraging,
employer efforts to comply with the Act by voluntarily remedying their unfair labor practices.346 That is undoubtedly a result to be applauded.34 7

150 N.L.R.B. 1427, 1431 (1965):
[I]n considering whether or not certain activities of the participants in a preelection campaign prevent the voters from making a free and untrammeled choice in
selecting a bargaining representative, a determination should be based upon the
total complex of the activities. Isolated incidents which may, in one context be
interpreted as interference with the "laboratory conditions" for an election, may,
as elements of another campaign theme, take on an entirely different meaning
and convey an entirely different impression to employees.
344. Dist. Council 47, AFSCME, 274 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1437 (1985); see also Broyhill
Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1366 (1982) (declining to apply Passavant in a "mechanical manner").
345. See Dallas Times Herald, 315 N.L.R.B. 700,710 (1994).
346. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
347. See Kawasaki Motors Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 502, 519 (1981) ("I applaud any efforts
made by [an employer] to limit or halt the effects of its own wrongdoing .. "); Transport
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 854, 862 (1976) ("The Board does not seek to prolong unfair labor practices but to prevent them."); Kawasaki Motors Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 502, 519 (1981) ("I applaud any efforts made by [an employer] to limit or halt the effects of its own wrongdoing .... ").

